Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 31
Issue 5 November 1998

Article 5

1998

The Doctrine of Specialty: An Argument for a More Restrictive
Rauscher Interpretation After State v. Pang
Hugh C. Thatcher

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hugh C. Thatcher, The Doctrine of Specialty: An Argument for a More Restrictive Rauscher Interpretation
After State v. Pang, 31 Vanderbilt Law Review 1321 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol31/iss5/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

The Doctrine of Specialty:
An
Argument for a More Restrictive
Rauscher Interpretation After State v.
Pang

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION ......................................................

1322

II.

EXTRADITION AND THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY ..........

1324
1324
1326
1329
1330
1330
1331

A.
B.

C.
III.

POST-RAUSCHER INTERPRETATION OF THE
SPECIALTY DOCTRINE .............................................

A.
B.
IV.
V.

VI.

Extradition.................................................
Treaty Interpretation...................................
1.
Textual Approach ............................
2.
Intent-Oriented Approach ................
3.
Application of Interpretive Methods.
The Doctrine of Specialty .............................

1336

Paroutian-Fiocconi
.......................................
The Application of Paroutian-Fiocconito

1337

Treaty-BasedExtradition.............................
STATE V. PANG ......................................................
A MORE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE
SPECIALTY DOCTRINE .............................................
A.
Extradition: An Exception to the Rule ...........
B.
United States v. Rauscher ...........................
C.
Treaty Interpretation...................................
D.
The PracticalReality of Extradition...............
1.
Fatal Variance ................................
2.
Time and Distance and the Right
to a Speedy Trial .............................
E.
A Proposed Compromise: Stop and Count
to Ten ........................................................
CONCLUSION .........................................................

1341
1345

1321

1352
1353
1356
1356
1358
1359
1364
1366
1367

1322

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:1321

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 5, 1995, four Seattle firefighters died fighting an
arson fire.1 Although the prime suspect, Martin Shaw Pang, was
indicted in March of 1995, he did not enter into a plea agreement
until February of 1998.2 The three years between the indictment
and plea were marked by Pang's flight to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
his subsequent extradition to the United States, and a furious
legal battle between his attorneys and the King County
Prosecutor's Office over an element of extradition law known as
the doctrine of specialty.3
Although the United States sought Pang's extradition for
arson and four counts of felony murder, the Federal Supreme
Court of the United States of Brazil granted extradition only for
the arson count. 4 Upon Pang's return to Seattle he moved to sever
or dismiss the murder counts from the indictment, arguing that
under the doctrine of specialty he could only be charged with
those offenses for which extradition was granted.5 The Supreme
Court of the State of Washington agreed with Pang, noting that
the extradition order was clear and unambiguous, and that Brazil
did not otherwise consent to Pang's prosecution for the felony
murder charges. 6 In so holding, the Pang court became one of the

few courts to strictly follow the specialty doctrine and hold that

1.
See Thomas W. Haines et al., Four Seattle FirefightersKilled: Homicide
Investigators Seek Clues in Deadliest Fire Everfor Department, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan.
6, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Four Seattle FirefightersKilled].
2.
State v. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d 852, 940 P.2d 1293, 1295, 1997 WL
425977 (en banc) (pagination to Washington Reports, 2d Series, not yet available),
opinion modified and corrected by State v. Pang, 948 P.2d 381 (Wash.) (citation to
Washington Reports, 2d Series, not yet available) cert denied in Washington v.
Pang, 118 S. Ct. 628 (1997). See Jack Broom & Eric Nalder, PangPleaAgreement:
'Finality,' SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 19, 1998, available at Seattle Times Web Archive
<http://www.seattletimes.com> (visited July 25, 1998) (plea entered Feb. 19,
1998).
3.
See Pang, 940 P.2d 1294-1314. In essence, the doctrine of specialty
dictates that a state requesting extradition may prosecute an extradited person
only for those offenses for which extradition is granted. See United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1886); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION: U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE 429 (3d ed. 1996). If the state from which
extradition is requested consents to prosecution on additional offenses then the
doctrine does not apply. See id. at 429. The doctrine also allows the requested
state to place limits on the punishment that may be meted out upon conviction.
See id. at 434. The doctrine is also known as the principle of specialty, and
specialty may be spelled "speciality." See id at 429.
4.
See Pang,940 P.2d at 1325.
5.
See id. at 1294-95.
6.
See id. at 1325.
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an extradited person cannot be charged with offenses other than

7
those for which the extradition was granted.
This Note examines how U.S. courts have weakened the

specialty doctrine in treaty-based extradition to the United States.
Although courts have consistently paid lip service to its vitality,
the doctrine of a specialty has often been set aside to allow

prosecution for additional offenses. 8 This Note examines the
primary line of inquiry that has been used by courts to interpret
the doctrine, and suggests that it is incorrect. A correct
interpretation of the doctrine requires a presumption that the
extradited person may not be charged with additional offenses.
Part II of this Note will outline the doctrine of specialty and
the role it plays in international extradition. Part III will present
the development of the modern interpretation of the doctrine. Part
IV will highlight the problems created by this loose interpretation
using State v. Pang as a paradigm. Part V will present a more
restrictive interpretation: when extradition is granted pursuant to
treaty it should be presumed that the extradited person may not
9
be prosecuted for additional offenses.

7.
See generally Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 318-22 (1907);
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 429-30; United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1374-75
(9th Cir. 1993).
8.
For stronger specialty analyses, see United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d
1567, 1572-76 (11th Cir. 1995), and Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1373-75. A person
who is the subject of extradition proceedings is termed the "relator." The country
seeking extradition is the "requesting" state, while the country asked to yield the
relator is the "requested" state.
9.
This Note will not address the dual criminality requirement of the
specialty doctrine, nor will it address the impact of extra-territorial kidnapping
upon the extradition process after United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655,
112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). In addition, this Note will not address the post-extradition
standing of the relator to assert the rights of the requested state in United States
courts. The portion of the specialty doctrine addressed herein is the interpretation
of the doctrine after a challenge based on specialty has been raised and heard by
the court, no matter who the petitioner. For a discussion of the relator's ability to
assert the rights of the requested state, see Jacques Semmelman, The Doctrine of
Specialty in the FederalCourts: Making Sense of United States v. Rauscher, 34 VA.
J. INT'L L. 71 (1993); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Comment, Standing to Allege
Violations of the Doctrine of Specialty: An Examination of the Relationship between
the Individual and the Sovereign, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1187 (1995); David Runtz,
Note, The Principle of Specialty: A Bifurcated Analysis of the Rights of the Accused,
29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 407 (1991).
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II. EXTRADITION AND THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY
A. Extradition
Extradition was first developed in ancient times as a tool to
maintain the internal legal order of states. 0 As such, the focus of
extradition was almost exclusively upon those persons who
threatened a state's domestic legal order, including religious and
political offenders." Because the activities of common criminals
did not typically impact the sovereign or public order, the
12
extradition of these persons received low priority.

One prominent authority has identified four periods of
extradition history:
(1) ancient times to the seventeenth century-a period revealing an
almost exclusive concern for political and religious offenders; (2)
the eighteenth century and half of the 19th century-a period of
treaty-making chiefly concerned with military offenders . . .; (3)
1833 to 1948-a period of collective concern for suppressing
common criminality; and (4) post-1948 . . . which ushered in a
greater concern for protecting human rights of persons and
revealed an awareness of the need to have international due
process of law regulate international relations. 13

Modem extradition practice dates from the eighteenth
century, when European states began to develop extradition as a
tool to engender peaceful relations between states. 14 This practice
developed further in the mid-to-late nineteenth century when
states began to express a collective concern for suppressing
criminal activity.' 5 The United States did not extradite anyone
during the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries
because there was only one extradition treaty in force (with Great
Britain) and Congress had failed to pass any legislation
implementing the treaty or authorizing extradition in the absence
of a treaty. 16 By comparison, in 1995, the United States had
17
extradition treaties with 103 states.

10.
11.
12.
13.

See id at 3-4.
See id.
Id.

14.

See id. at 4-5; see also GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 10

(1991).
15.

See BAsSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 4.

See BASSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 3.

16.
See MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO A. RISTAU, 4 INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE CRIMINAL: EXTRADITION 20-21 (Supp. 1995).

17.

See id at 55.
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Although contemporary extradition practice is still concerned
with the enforcement of criminal law, extradition remains the
exception rather than the rule in international relations.1 8 This is
in part because extradition is the antithesis to the traditional
right of a nation-state to grant asylum or shelter from prosecution
to any person within its territory. 19 However, because the
majority of criminal activity is still regulated by the criminal law
of individual states,20 extradition is necessary to allow a state
with jurisdiction over a crime to gain personal jurisdiction over an
21
accused person not within its territorial jurisdiction.
The structure of international extradition emphasizes that it
is an exception of limited application. Contemporary extradition
practice holds that there is no duty to extradite in the absence of
an extradition treaty. 22 Even when extradition is sought pursuant

to a treaty, most states view extradition as within the discretion of
the requested state. 2 3 Although the human rights theory of
international relations advocates procedural safeguards in
extradition to protect the rights of an extradited person,
contemporary practice is predominantly influenced by realist
international political theory and extradition is viewed as a
process that protects the rights of states that are party to an
extradition treaty.2 4 In this framework, the rights of the accused
are essentially those of the requested state and are strictly

tailored to the specific protections granted in the particular treaty
at issue.2 5 Extradition terminology reflects this bias, as the state

18.

See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992);

BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 383.
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 2.
19.
20.
But see generally LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1997). "International criminal law has expanded
more in the last fifty years than in the previous five hundred." Id. at 2.
21.
See I. A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 210 (11th ed. 1994);
BASSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 5-6.
22.
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 6; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 474, introductory note at 557
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Other bases of extradition include comity and
reciprocity. Although reciprocity in this context is an independent ground for
extradition, it is also a sub-component of treaty-based extradition. See infra note
60 and accompanying text; see also BASSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 383.
23.
See RESTATEMENT, supranote 22, § 475, at 562 (stating that even when
a bilateral extradition treaty to which the United States is a party states that the
U.S "shall" extradite, the executive has some discretion as to whether extradition
will be granted); BASsIOUNI, supranote 3, at 7.
See Papandrea, supra note 9, at 1196-98; see also John Dugard &
24.
Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extraditionwith Human Rights, 92 Am. J.
INT'L L. 187, 188-90 (1998) (noting that extradition is traditionally based on states'
rights).
See United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986)
25.
(noting that treaty "protection exists only to the extent that the surrendering
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asking for extradition is the "requesting" state, the state of refuge
is the "requested" state, and the subject of extradition is termed
26
the "relator."
B. Treaty Interpretation
"There is no part of the law of treaties which the text-writer
approaches with more trepidation than the question of
"2 7
interpretation.

U.S. extradition law is statutorily based, but relies on
bilateral treaties for the creation and activation of any duty to
extradite. 2 8 As a result, there must typically be an extradition
treaty before extradition proceedings may be commenced. 29 This
is consistent with well-established principles of international law,
which provide that a nation-state does not have an obligation to
surrender a person from its territory to another state absent a

country wishes," and that "the person extradited may raise whatever objections
the rendering country might have").
26.
See generally BASSIOUNI, supranote 3.

27.
LORD MCNAIR, QC, LL.D., B.F.A., THE LAW OF TREATIES, 1961, at 364
(1961).
28.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3189 (1994).
29.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184 (1994). 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) creates a
specific exception to the treaty requirement:
(b) The provisions of this chapter shall be construed to permit, in the
exercise of comity, the surrender of persons, other than citizens, nationals,
or permanent residents of the United States, who have committed crimes
of violence against nationals of the United States in foreign countries
without regard to the existence of any treaty of extradition with such
foreign government if the Attorney General certifies, in writing, that(1) evidence has been presented by the foreign government that indicates
that had the offenses been committed in the United States, they would
constitute crimes of violence as defined under section 16 of this title; and
(2) the offenses charged are not of a political nature.
18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) (1994); see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 53-54, 53 n. 114
(describing one specific case where the United States granted extradition absent a
treaty, and referring to two others in treatises) (citing JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A
TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 33-35 (2 vols. 1891); 6
MARJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 744-45 (1968)). Although most
extradition treaties create a mandatory obligation to extradite, the United States
extradition statute may be construed as allowing the executive to have the
discretion to extradite despite a formal approval by the judiciary. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 475, at 562; BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 767-68
(citing Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313, 1316
(1962); Tracey Hughes, ExtraditionReform: The Role of the Judiciary in Protecting
the Rights of a Requested Individual, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 298-99
(1986)).
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treaty provision.3 0 The absence of such an obligation is an
extension of a state's absolute domestic sovereignty over all
persons within its territory, which necessarily results in the
exclusion of other states, and the creation of asylum for persons
prosecuted elsewhere. 3 1 States have consistently asserted their
right to extend asylum; absent a treaty, a state is under no
obligation to forego granting asylum, of retract an offer of
32
asylum.
Under the U.S. constitutional framework, treaties become
part of U.S. domestic law, equivalent to statutes, and are
subordinate only to the Constitution.3 3 As such, treaties cannot
authorize what the Constitution does not allow. 3 4 The
Constitution provides that treaties are the law of the land, equal

30.
See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 475 at 564 (citing Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290
U.S. 276, 287 (1933)); BASsIOUNI, supra note 3, at 6; CAPTAIN EDWIN F. GLENN,
HAND-BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1895).
31.
See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 402, at 901 (Sir Robert Jennings,
QC, & Sir Arthur Watts, KCMG, QC, eds., 9th ed., 1992) [hereinafter
OPPENHEIM'S]. This Note uses asylum in its general sense, meaning the right of a
state to allow a person to remain within its borders. There are numerous theories
of jurisdiction that states utilize in order to assert jurisdiction over an accused
person. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 295-381; SHEARER, supra note 21, at 183217; Adelheid Puttler, ExtraterritorialApplication of Criminal Law: Jurisdictionto
Prosecute Drug Traffic Conducted by Aliens Abroad, in EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 103, 105-15 (Karl M. Meessen, ed., 1996).
Prominent examples include territorial jurisdiction, which is based on the
physical location of the crime within the boundaries of the state. See BASSIOUNI,
supranote 3, at 297-300; SHEARER, supra note 21, at 184-210; Puttler, supra, at
106. Passive personality jurisdiction is asserted when the victim of a crime is a
national or citizen of the state seeking to acquire the accused. See BASSIOUNI,
supra note 3, at 349-53; SHEARER, supra note 21, at 210-11. Active personality
jurisdiction provides that whenever a citizen or national of a state commits a
crime that state has jurisdiction. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 346-49;
SHEARER, supra note 21, at 210. Universal jurisdiction provides that a state may

prosecute a person for an act internationally regarded as a crime regardless of
where the act took place, and regardless of the law of the state where the act took
place. See BAsSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 356-67; Puttler, supra, at 110-12.
32.
See GLENN, supra note 30, at 85-86; OPPENHEIM'S, supra note 31, § 402,
at 901.
33.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 419 ("A treaty,
then, is a law of the land, as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions
prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be
determined.").
34.
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957). "It would be manifestly
contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well as those
who were responsible for the Bill of Rights-let alone alien to our entire
constitutional history and tradition-to construe Article VI as permitting the
United States to exercise power under an international agreement without
observing constitutional prohibitions. .. ." Id. at 17 (citing discussion in the
Virginia Convention on the adoption of the Constitution, 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 500-

19 (1836)).
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to Federal statutes in weight.3 5 In the event that a statute
conflicts with a treaty provision, the dates of enactment of the
treaty and statute become dispositive; absent clear indication

otherwise, a subsequently enacted statute will overrule an
inconsistent treaty provision.3 6 Although treaty creation (via
negotiation and ratification) is an exclusive federal power
allocated to the executive and legislature, 3 7 treaty interpretation

is allocated to the judiciary.3 8 An interpretation of a treaty by a
federal court is binding upon the other branches of the federal
3 9
government and the states.
Federal and state courts have not utilized uniform and
systematic methods to interpret treaties, 40 and a few courts have
added to the confusion by utilizing international treaty
interpretation methods as set forth in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. 4 1 Courts tend to use particular interpretive

35.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

36.
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 73; William J. Aceves, The Vienna
Convention on ConsularRelations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 289 (1998) (citing The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S.
580, 599 (1884)).
37.
See BAsSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 68.
38.
See U.S CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1 (the jurisdiction of the courts extends
to 'all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under .... Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under ...
."); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478
U.S. 221, 230 (1986) ("the courts have the authority to construe treates [sic] ...
."); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) ("courts interpret treaties for
themselves"); Harold Hongju Koh, The President Versus the Senate in Treaty
Interpretation: What's All the Fuss About?, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 331, 333 (1990) ("the
final authority to interpret the treaty rests... with the judiciary ....
).
39.
See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation,41
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 953, 956-57 (1994); Koh, supranote 38, at 333; Martin A. Rogoff,
Interpretation of InternationalAgreements by Domestic Courts and the Politics of
InternationalTreaty Relations: Reflections on some Recent Decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 559, 677 (1996).

40.

"[There is a] poverty of treaty construction in this country. There is no

intelligible set of principles for determining meaning from treaty texts."
Bederman, supra note 39, at 954. Nor, traditionally, has there been uniformity
and consistency on an international basis: "Customary international law has not
developed rules and modes of interpretation having the definiteness and precision
to which this section aspires." RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 325, com. a., at
196. Bederman has suggested that this may be because of the way treaties are
created (initiated by the executive with limited legislative oversight) and because
of their unique status as concurrent international and domestic law. Bederman,
supranote 39, at 954.
41.
See Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 308-09, 326-52 (1988)
(discussing seven cases where U.S. courts invoked the Vienna Convention to
assist with treaty interpretation). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
has been described as the codification of rules of treaty interpretation that existed
in customary international law as well as the reflection of progressive
developments in international law. See ic. at 287. See also Vienna Convention on

1998]

THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY

1329

methods as guides rather than as obligatory legal norms. 42
Although the type of international agreement may have an impact
on which interpretive method a court applies, 43 most courts
44
utilize a combination of textual and intent-oriented analysis.
1. Textual Approach
As suggested by the name, courts using a textual approach to
analyze a treaty initially look to the text of the treaty to ascertain
the plain meaning of the words. 43 If the text of the treaty is clear,
no other interpretive methods may be used. 46 However, if the
language is susceptible to more than one meaning, a court will
move beyond the text of the treaty.4 7 In determining how the
language of the text is to be construed, the context of the

the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force January
27, 1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 769 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Although the United States is a signatory, the agreement has not been ratified by
the Senate. See Frankowska, supra, at 286, 295-98 (discussing the initial
ratification proceedings and subsequent inaction). The Restatement chose to
follow §§ 31 and 33 of the Vienna Convention rather than attempt to articulate
the methods employed by U.S. courts. RESTATEMENT, supranote 22, § 325, at 19697. The comment states that the section "represents generally accepted principles
and the United States has also appeared willing to accept them despite
differences of nuance and emphasis." Id., cmt. a., at 196. See id., cmt. g., at 198,
and reporters note 4, at 200 (comparing the international and United States

approach). A primary approaches difference between the United States and the
look outside the text of a

Vienna Convention is the willingness of U.S. courts to

treaty in search of intent, and "embrace a meaning advanced by the executive
branch that may not accord with international expectations or the canon of liberal
interpretation and good faith." Bederman, supra note 39, at 972. See infra note

56 for the definition of rule of liberality.
42.
See EDWARD SLAVKO YAMBRUSIC, TREATY INTERPRETATION: THEORY AND
REALITY 26 (1987).
43.
This is because courts have tried, in addition to labeling international
agreements sui generis, to compare international agreements with domestic
contracts and legislation to determine the appropriate interpretive rule. See
Bederman, supra note 39, at 963. Courts have found similarity between both
domestic concepts and several different types of international agreements. See id.
44.
See id. at 964. The classification of methods into these two approaches
is by no means a settled paradigm. Compare id. at 964-72 with BASSIOUNI, supra
note 3, at 75-93. While both authors articulate many of the same approaches to
interpretation, it is clear that there is no particular hierarchy or paradigmatic
approach beyond an initial consideration of the text and the intent of the parties.
See also P.K. MENON, THE LAW OF TREATIES BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 69-77 (1992) (examining international schools of thought on treaty
interpretation and identifying subjective (intent), teleological, and textual
approaches).
45.
See BASSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 75; Bederman, supranote 39, at 964.
46.
See Bederman, supranote 39, at 965 (citing Maximov v. United States,
373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)).
47.
See id.
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language is considered. 48 Moreover, a court may also disregard
the plain meaning of the text if the plain meaning results in a
reading inconsistent with the intent or expectations of the party
states. 49
2. Intent-Oriented Approach
The intent-oriented approach requires the court to interpret
the treaty in a manner that effectuates the intentions of the
parties. 50 If the intent is not clear from the language of the text,
then courts may look to extrinsic sources for evidence of the
parties' intent. 5 Two extrinsic sources that have been used by
courts include the negotiating history of the agreement and
52
subsequent practice by parties under the treaty.
3. Application of Interpretive Methods
Both of the above methods are used and blended with each
other by courts seeking to properly interpret treaties.5 3 Both will
also be modified by other interpretive canons that are used by
U.S. courts. For example, courts typically give significant
deference to senatorial and Executive interpretations of
international agreements.5 4 Courts also apply the rule of
liberality, and assert that treaties must be construed in good
faith.5 5 The text of the treaty is usually interpreted in a fashion

48.
See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1985). This approach is
similar to the Vienna Convention, which provides that a "treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
Vienna Convention, supranote 41, art. 31, para. 1.
49.
See Maximov, 373 U.S. at 54.
50.
See Valentine v. United States ex rel Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936);
BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 75 (citing Sumitomo Shoji American Inc. v. Avagliano,
457 U.S. 176 (1980)); Bederman, supranote 39, at 970.
51.
See Bederman, supranote 39, at 970.
52.
See id. at 970-71.
53.
See, e.g., Air France,470 U.S. 392.
54.
See Bederman, supra note 39, at 957-63; Rogoff, supra note 39, at
566. See also Bederman, supranote 39, at 958 ("[A]n otherwise valid and express
senatorial declaration about the meaning of a treaty provision, transmitted to the
President with its advice and consent, is... dispositive on courts later construing
the agreement.") (citing Northwest Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States,
324 U.S. 335, 351-53 (1945); Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 35 (1869);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 314, cmt. d.)).

55.
See Bederman, supranote 39, at 966-70. The rule of liberality requires
that treaties be liberally construed. "[11f a treaty fairly admits of two constructions,
one restricting the rights which may be claimed under it, and the other enlarging
it, the more liberal construction is to be preferred." Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290
U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933). See also Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 192-93
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that is consistent with the other terms of the treaty. 5 6 On
occasion a court will use canons of statutory interpretation,
including expressio unius exclusio est alterius and eiusdem
generis.5 7 Finally, some courts utilize the interpretive criteria set
forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 58
C. The Doctrine of Specialty
U.S. law has five substantive requirements that must be
satisfied for extradition to and from the United States: (1)
reciprocity; (2) double criminality; (3) an extraditable offense; (4)
non-inquiry; and (5) specialty. 59
The first, reciprocity, essentially requires that either (a) the
states involved in an extradition reciprocally recognize their
respective judicial processes, or (b) symmetry exists between the

(1961). "We cannot accept the state court's more restrictive interpretation when
we view the Treaty in the light of its entire language and history. This Court has
many times set its face against treaty interpretations that unduly restrict rights a
treaty is adopted to protect." Id. (citing Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150,
163 (1940); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 128-29 (1928)). Bederman is of the
opinion that the rule of liberality and good faith may collapse into each other and

form a teleological inquiry, Bederman, supra note 39, at 966-70, although the
Restatement notes that this approach is disfavored. REsTATEMENT, supranote 22,
§ 325, reporters n.4 at 200.
See BASSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 84.
56.
57.
See i.- at 88-91. Expressio unius exclusio est alterius posits that the
inclusion of one thing (in the text) implies the exclusion of that which is not
included. See id. at 88-89. Eiusdem generis posits that when general words in the
text are followed by specific words, the specific words will control the general
words. See id. at 89-91.
58.
See Frankowska, supra note 41, at 308-09, 326-352; Bederman, supra
note 39, at 955, 974. "[A] trend is developing for courts to at least consider the
interpretive rules of the [Vienna Convention]. As yet, there exists little consistency
in applying [it]." Id. at 956.
59.
See BAssiOUNI, supra note 3, at 384. The requirements are applied at
different stages of the extradition process. See ic. Reciprocity, double criminality,
extraditable offense status, and non-inquiry are typically applied at the
extradition proceeding that is held immediately after a request for extradition has
been made. See id. at 388-89. Accordingly, these are most often applied in U.S.
courts when the United States is the requested country. Only if these elements
are satisfied will extradition be granted. See it. at 384. For extradition to the
United States, a similar type of hearing is held and these elements are applied by
the appropriate foreign authority. By contrast, specialty is typically applied after
extradition has occurred, as the relator is seeking to challenge his prosecution for
a particular offense for which extradition was not granted. See id. at 429. Such a
challenge will probably be heard in a U.S. court. It should also be noted that
because specialty is the enforcement mechanism for other requirements of an
extradition treaty, such as dual criminality, and the political offense exception,
these elements are in turn raised as components of an alleged specialty violation.
See id. at 436.
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judicial processes of each state. 60 This element is typically
addressed in U.S. courts prior to the extradition of a person to the
United States.
Double criminality requires the offenses for which extradition
is requested be a crime in both the requested and requesting
states.6 1 This requirement may be interpreted in one of three
ways: In order to qualify, the crime must be (1) chargeable, (2)
chargeable and prosecutable, or (3) chargeable, prosecutable, and
likely to result in a conviction. 62 Unlike reciprocity, double
criminality is often asserted by defendants who are either
contesting their extradition from the United States or challenging
their extradition to the United States (usually after they have
arrived).63
The extraditable offense requirement necessitates either (1)
that the offense be specifically listed in the extradition treaty, or
(2) that the offense falls within the definition of an extraditable
offense as created by a formula set forth in the extradition
treaty.6 4 This element also is asserted by defendants contesting
65
extradition to and from the United States.
The duty of non-inquiry is placed upon U.S. courts when

considering an extradition request from another state. The court
may not inquire into the procedures used by the requesting state
to obtain probable cause for extradition, question the means by
which a criminal conviction is obtained under the system of the
requesting state, or inquire about the penalty that the relator will
66
be subject to upon conviction.
The doctrine of specialty provides that following extradition
the relator may be charged only with those offenses for which

60.

See id. at 385. This may include reciprocity of jurisdictional basis for

extradition, procedural basis, or whether a state consents to extradition of its own
nationals. See id. at 385-87.
61.
See id. at 388.
62.
63.

See id. at 389-90.
See United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1993)

(challenging charge of use of telephone to facilitate a drug felony under 21 U.S.C.
§ 843(b)).

64.
See BAsSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 394. A possible formulaic clause might
provide for extradition for "any... offense which is punishable under the laws of
both Parties by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year,
or by a more severe penalty, unless surrender for such offense is prohibited by
the laws of the requested Party."

Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the

United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 493, 494 (quoting
proposed U.S-Hong Kong extradition agreement).
65.
See United States v. Jetter, 722 F.2d 371, 373 (8th Cir. 1983)
(challenging extradition on conspiracy charge because such a crime was not set
forth in'the extradition treaty).

66.

See BAsSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 486.
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extradition is granted. 6 7 Because the requested state may grant
extradition for any or all of the charges that the requesting state
has set forth in the extradition request, the practical effect of the
doctrine is that the requested state may exercise control over the
prosecution of the relator long after the relator has left the
jurisdiction or physical control of the requested state. This
powerful right ensures the integrity of the extradition process
because a relator may not be ceded upon false pretenses and
charged with different crimes at a later time. 68
Although states may enter into extradition agreements for a

variety of reasons, the specialty doctrine undoubtedly provides an

incentive to enter into such agreements. 6 9 A state using the
doctrine can condition its discretion to extradite based on
concrete requirements, ensuring that the policies supporting
extradition are satisfied in a manner that is consistent with both
the state's legal paradigm and any necessary political
70
considerations.
The specialty doctrine is typically incorporated into an
extradition treaty through an express specialty provision. 7 1 In the
United States, the doctrine is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3186,72 and
the foundation for the doctrine in U.S. domestic law is the
decision rendered in United States v. Rauscher.7 3 William
Rauscher, a U.S. national, was indicted for murder and cruel and
unusual punishment after killing a crew member of a U.S. flag
vessel at sea. 74 Rauscher was extradited by Great Britain to stand
trial for murder at the United States' request. 75 Upon his arrival

67.
See id. at 429. The doctrine may also allow the requested state to limit
the punishment meted out upon conviction if it is not commensurate with that
which would be imposed by the requested state for the same crime. See id at
435.
68.
See id- at 433-34.
69.
For a discussion of the factors that motivate states to enter into
extradition agreements see Papandrea, supranote 9, at 1190-93.
70.
See Rogoff, supra note 39, at 675-83 (addressing types of political

pressures and their impact upon the treaty interpretation process by United
States courts).
71.
See ABBELL & RISTAU, supranote 16, at 80.

72.
"The Secretary of State may order the person committed under
sections 3184 [Fugitives from foreign country to United States] or 3185 [Fugitives
from country under control of United States into the United States] of this title to
be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government, to be tried for
the offense of which charged)" 18 U.S.C. 3186 1 (emphasis added).
73.
119 U.S. 407 (1886).
74.
See id. at 409. Rauscher was the second mate on board the J.F.

Chapman. See id.
75.

See id.

1334

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:1321

convicted of, cruel
in the United States he was charged with, and
76
and unusual punishment instead of murder.
The Supreme Court held that Rauscher's conviction could not
stand because Great Britain had not granted extradition for that
offense. 7 7 The Court began its discussion of the issue by noting
that extradition was not the historical norm in international law:
It is only in modem times that the nations of the earth have
imposed upon themselves the obligation of delivering up these

fugitives from justice to the States where their crimes were
IT]here was no wellcommitted, for trial and punishment ....
defined obligation on one country to deliver up such fugitives to
another, and though such delivery was often made, it was upon the
principle of comity, and within the discretion of the government
whose action was invoked; and it has never been recognized as

which
among those obligations of one government towards 7another
8
rest upon established principles of international law.

However, the Court noted that the instant matter was governed
79
by the United States-Great Britain Webster-Ashburton Treaty,
which did create a duty to extradite, and8 0that the matter before
the court was one of treaty interpretation.
The Court's interpretation did not start with the specific
provisions of the treaty-probably because the treaty language did
not address the doctrine of specialty either explicitly or
implicitly. 8 ' Instead, the Court reviewed the persuasive
authorities on international law, which uniformly asserted that an
extradited person could only be charged with the offenses for
82
which extradition was granted, even in the absence of a treaty.
The Court also discussed exactly how treaties were incorporated
into the U.S. domestic legal structure, noting that "[a] treaty,
then, is the law of the land, as an act of Congress is, whenever its
provisions prescribe a rule by which8 3 the rights of the private
citizen or subject may be determined."

76.

See id.

77.
78.

See id. at 409, 433.
Id at 411-12.

See id. at 410-11, 415; Webster-Ashburton Treaty August 9, 1842,
79.
U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. X, 8 Stat. 572, 576.
See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 416.
80.

See Webster-Ashburton Treaty, supranote 79, art. X, at 576.
81.
See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 416-17. This review included general
82.
authorities on international relations, (citing William Beach Lawrence, 14 ALBANY
L. J. 85, 15 ALBANY L. J. 224, 16 ALBANY L. J. 361; Judge Lowell, 10 AM. L. REV.
617 (1875-6); David Dudley Field, 122 FIELD'S INT'L CODE § 237) and authorities
that had reviewed the specific treaty that was before the court (citing Spear,
EDWARD CLARKE, 38 CLARKE ON ExTRADITION (1867)). See id.

83.

I& at 419.
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Following this review, the Court held that it was the intent of
84
the parties that the specialty doctrine be included in the treaty.
Although the Court conceded at the outset that the starting point
for treaty interpretation was the language of the treaty,8 5 the
Court's holding was based on realpolitik. In the Court's opinion, a
state's decision to extradite would necessarily be limited by its
own political interests. Although a state might grant extradition of
common criminals out of goodwill, it might not see benefit
accruing to it from the extradition of political offenders or minor
offenders.8 6 The Court noted that the tradition of granting asylum
to political refugees was a long standing tradition, and that it was:
very clear that this treaty did not intend to depart in this respect
from the recognized public law which had prevailed in the absence
of treaties, and that it was not intended that this treaty should be
used for any other purpose than to secure the trial of the person
87
extradited for one of the offences [sic] enumerated in the treaty.

The specialty doctrine was "an appropriate adjunct to the
discretionary exercise of the power of rendition .
ss"88
It was an
enforcement mechanism to protect the discretion of the state
granting extradition by limiting the prosecution of the relator
post-extradition.8 9 The Court felt that this limitation was set forth
explicitly in the procedural requirements of extradition, noting
that if the requested state was "to have no influence in limiting
the prosecution in the country where the offence [sic] is charged
to have been committed, there is very little use for this
particularity in charging a specific offence [sic].. .. "90
The Court then set forth a second ground for its holding by
noting that the specialty doctrine was codified in federal
statutes. 9 ' The Court interpreted the statutes to apply to all
treaties to which the United States was a party, and held that
under the statutes persons extradited from the United States, or
persons extradited to the United States, had a right to be
prosecuted only for those offenses for which extradition was
granted. 9 2 The Court's description of the right was summarized in
the Rauscherholding:
[H]e shall be tried only for the offence [sic] with which he is charged
in the extradition proceedings and for which he was delivered up,

84.
85.
86.

See id. at 420.
See iL at 419.
See id. at 420.

87.

Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 419.
See id.
Id. at 421.
See id. at 423 (citing Rev. Stat. §§ 5272, 5275).
See id at 423-24.
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and that if not tried for that, or after trial and acquittal, he shall
have a reasonable time to leave the country before he is arrested
upon the charge of any other crime committed previous to his
93
extradition.

Although the Rauscher decision has been criticized as
particular to its time and a product of the political circumstances
surrounding the treaty between the United States and Great
Britain, 94 the decision remains the legal foundation for analysis of
the specialty doctrine when the United States seeks, pursuant to
treaty, to have an individual brought to the United States to stand
trial. 95 The decision is widely accepted as standing for the
proposition that the relator may only be charged with the offenses

for which extradition is granted. 96 Subsequent interpretation of
the doctrine, however, has weakened this holding significantly.

III. PoST-RAUSCHER INTERPRETATION OF THE SPECIALTY DOCTRINE
Post-Rauseher interpretation and application of the specialty
doctrine by U.S. courts has gradually weakened the doctrine. The
approach of the courts has been similar to that articulated by the
court in United States v. Saccoccia: "Specialty . . . is not a

93.
Id at 424.
94.
See generally United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 1008-09 (5th
Cir. 1988); Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 480 (2d Cir. 1972);
Semmelman, supranote 9.
95.
See generally United States v. Alvarez-Machain. 504 U.S. 655, 659-70
(1992).
96.
See generally id. at 659-60; United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567,
1573 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir.
1993); United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1297 (3d Cir. 1991); Kaufman,
858 F.2d at 1007; United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir. 1987). But
see United States v. Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d 502, 506 (11th Cir. 1995)
(interpreting Rauscher as holding that a relator may not be charged with a crime
not enumerated in the extradition treaty.); United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888,
896 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Rauscherheld that the indictment was invalid because it
charged... a crime not enumerated in the treaty."); United States v. Flores, 538
F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir. 1976) ("fA]n extradited defendant may not be charged and
tried for crimes not enumerated in the . . . extradition treaty."); Shapiro v.
Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir. 1973) (interpreting Rauscher as
proscribing prosecution for crimes not enumerated in the extradition treaty).
These counter interpretations have been subject to criticism in turn. See David B.
Sweet, Application of Doctrine of Specialty to Federal Criminal Prosecution of
Accused Extradited from Foreign Country, 112 A.L.R. FED. 473, 518-19
(contrasting Rauscher interpretation in United States v. Sensi with Rauscher

holding). Some courts that do not read Rauscher so broadly find the authority in
other cases for the proposition that the relator may only be prosecuted on those
offenses for which extradition is granted. See Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d at 506
(citing United States v. Archbold-Newball, 554 F.2d 665, 685 n.21 (5th Cir.
1977)); Flores, 538 F.2d at 944 (citing Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907)).
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hidebound dogma, but must be applied in a practical, common
sense fashion. Thus, obeisance to the principle of specialty does
not require that . . . the prosecution always be limited to specific
offenses enumerated in the surrendering state's extradition
order .... "97
In their efforts to reach "common sense" results, some courts
have adopted a very general standard which evaluates the
specialty claim from the perspective of the requested state. Courts
have articulated this standard differently, but in essence, the
standard allows the prosecution of the defendant so long as the
requested state would not consider the prosecution on additional
charges to breach the doctrine. 98 Because this standard is
necessarily fact-specific, it allows the court applying the standard
considerable leeway in determining if the requested state would
indeed object to the prosecution.
A. Paroutian-Fiocconi
One of the first courts to loosen the strict specialty
requirement set forth in Rauscher was the Second Circuit in
United States v. Paroutian.9 9 Paroutian was extradited from
Lebanon for narcotics trafficking under an indictment issued by
the Southern District of New York. 0 0° Upon his arrival in the
United States, he was indicted in the Eastern District of New
York, where he was convicted of conspiracy to import, receive,
and sell heroin, and two counts of receipt and concealment of
heroin. 01 ' Paroutian challenged his conviction of the two discrete
counts, alleging that Lebanon had not extradited him for those

97.
98.

58 F.3d 754, 767 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
See infra part III.A.

99.

299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).

100. See id. at 490. The reported case does not state if the extradition was
granted pursuant to treaty, although it does describe a formal extradition request,

extradition proceedings in Lebanon, and a formal Lebanese Warrant of
Extradition. See id. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181 does not show that the United States has
ever entered into an extradition agreement with Lebanon. However, the court in

Fiocconi v. Attorney Generalnoted that the United States-France extradition treaty
was extended to Lebanon upon French acquisition of mandate in 1924. 462 F.2d
475, 479 n.6 (2d Cir. 1992). This reference is presumably to the extradition treaty
signed between France and the United States on Jan. 6, 1909, effective July 27,

1911, 37 Stat. 1526. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181 "Treaties of Extradition." The court in
Fiocconinoted that it was questionable if the treaty continued to apply to Lebanon

after independence (in 1946). See Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 479 n.6. The court also

noted that the United States' request for extradition in Paroutianwas made under
the U.S.-France treaty. See id.
101.

See Paroutan,299 F.2d at 487, 490.
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offenses, and that as a result, his conviction on those counts
should be overturned.102
Without citing any authority, the court held that the test as
to whether the relator is tried for a separate offense is not "some
technical refinement of local law, but whether the extraditing
103
country would consider the offense" to be actually separate.
Reasoning that the purpose of the specialty doctrine as set forth
in Rauscheris to protect the discretion of the requested state, the
court acknowledged that the doctrine would prevent Paroutian's
trial for an offense that was "totally unrelated" to narcotics
trafficking. Nevertheless, the court held that because the
Lebanese were aware of the facts presented in the initial
to have been
indictment, they would not consider Paroutian
10 4
trafficking.
narcotics
but
anything
for
prosecuted
Although the Paroutian court did not cite any express
authority for its new interpretation of the specialty doctrine, it did
invite the reader to see generally Greene v. United States,10 5 where
the court was forced to reconcile the bright-line rule set forth in
Rauscherwith a technical defect in the extradition process. 10 6 In
the Greene, the United States requested extradition of an
individual from Canada, and extradition was granted for
prosecution of "participation in fraud by an agent or trustee" and
"participation in embezzlement." 10 7 Greene contested his
convictions for conspiracy to defraud and embezzlement on the
grounds that Canada had not granted extradition for either
crime. 108 In holding that Greene's convictions did not violate the
treaty, the court noted that "[w]hile the extradition and the
indictment must be for the same criminal acts, it does not follow
that the crime must have the same name in both countries ....
We are of opinion that the record shows that the first and second
indictments charge the defendants with an offense for which they
were extradited." 10 9
Thus, while Greene clearly supported the Paroutian court's
conclusion that the specialty doctrine was not to be construed so
strictly as to defeat the intent of the parties to an extradition
treaty (i.e., to facilitate extradition), the Paroutian court did not
have precedent supporting the new standard of evaluation. The

102. See id. at 490-9 1.
103. Id at 491.
104. Id.
105. 154 F. 401 (5th Cir. 1907).
106. See id. at 404-14.
107. Id- at 404. Extradition was sought pursuant to a 1889-90 treaty
between Great Britain and the United States. See id. at 403.
108. See id. at 404.
109. Id at 406-07.
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court made a significant theoretical leap when it equated the
procedural defects addressed in Greene with Lebanon's inability
to decide whether extradition should be granted with regard to
the discrete counts. The only possible way to squeeze Paroutian
within the interpretive precedent set by Greene was if the term
"narcotics trafficking" in the Lebanese indictment was intended as
a descriptive phrase inclusive of the discrete counts comprising
the whole. 11 0 Even if this was so, the doctrine was still weakened
considerably, as the Paroutian court lent authority to the
proposition that the requested state did not have the right to
review each charge against a relator in order to satisfy the United
States'
obligations during, at least, formal extradition
proceedings, and, at most, during extradition pursuant to treaty.
The Paroutian standard was utilized again by the Second
Circuit in 1972 in Fiocconi v. Attorney General.'
Although
Fiocconi involved extradition based on comity, not a treaty, the

court held that the specialty doctrine as encapsulated in Rauscher
applied even when no treaty was present.1 1 2 The court reasoned
that the purpose of the doctrine of specialty was to prevent the
United States from breaching international obligations, and that
there was the same need to act in good faith when granting
extradition based on comity. 1 3 Breach of the good faith obligation
would occur in the instant matter only if Italy would consider the
4
prosecution of Fiocconi to be a breach.1
The court in Fiocconi cited Rauscher as supporting this
approach, reasoning that the Rauscher court did not explicitly
discuss the need to consider the surrendering state's position on
the issue because political circumstances surrounding the
Rauscher decision made Great Britain's objection to Rauscher's
prosecution self evident." 5 The court also cited Paroutian as
authority for this approach, but acknowledged that the instant

110.

See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 908 (2d Cir. 1973)

(characterizing offenses in Paroutianas "so factually intertwined as to constitute a
logical whole").
111. 462 F.2d 475,480-81 (2d Cir. 1972).
112.
See id. at 480. This holding may have been overruled by implication by
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1993), where the Court
denied the defendant the rights that would have been accorded him under the

United States-Mexico extradition treaty because he was not removed to the
United States through formal proceedings under the treaty. It may be significant,
however, that the defendant in Fiocconi although not sought pursuant to treaty,
was obtained through formal extradition procedures in Italy. See Fiocconi, 462
F.2d at 477. Alvarez-Machain was kidnapped from Mexico and brought to the
United States by bounty hunters. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657.

113.

See Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 480.

114.

See id.

115.

See id.
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matter required the court to weaken the doctrine of specialty even
116
The charges challenged by the
more than ParoutiarL
defendants in Fiocconi were brought in Massachusetts after the
defendants were extradited to the United States based on
1 17
indictments issued in New York.

Although Italy was never offered the opportunity to evaluate
the charges prior to extradition, the Fiocconi court rationalized the
convictions because they were "of the same character" as the
original charges, involved simply a change of venue, and "with
appellants now having been found guilty, there can scarcely be a
doubt that sufficient proof to warrant extradition exists." 118 The
court then pointed out that its position was "somewhat fortified"
by the fact that an express clause setting forth the doctrine of
specialty was not to be found in the Italy-U.S. extradition
convention, and that the lack of such a clause was "some
indication of the limits of Italy's concern with the prosecution of
persons whom it surrenders to the United States and of the
conditions upon which extradition between the two countries
9
normally occurs.""
Fiocconi firmly established the Second Circuit's Paroutian
standard as precedent for courts interpreting the specialty
doctrine, despite the fact that Paroutian's extradition may not
have been pursuant to treaty, and that Fiocconi involved
extradition based on comity. Although relatively few cases were
120
decided using Paroutian-Fiocconiin the latter half of the 1970s,
the 1980s and 1990s saw a marked increase in the number of
courts utilizing the Paroutian-Fiocconi reasoning. As courts
grappled with difficult procedural and substantive issues, the
Second Circuit's standard offered a means by which courts could
appear to further the rationale behind the doctrine of specialty
while allowing the extradition process to continue without little
interference.
As the Paroutian-Fiocconiapproach garnered a wide following
in the 1980s and 90s, with several cases citing directly to
Paroutian and Fiocconi or their progeny, 12 1 the standard was

116.
117.
118.
119.

Seeid at481.
See id
Id.
Id. at482.

120. Some cases were denied using Paroutian-Fiocconi.See United States v.
Rossi, 545 F.2d 814, 815 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirming conviction on conspiracy
charge in superseding indictment when extradition was granted for charge in
original indictment and superseding charge extended scope of conspiracy by five
years).
121. See United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721 (11th Cir. 1989)
(affirming mail fraud and conspiracy convictions in part because the United
Kingdom waived any objections to charges set forth in the indictment); United
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accorded additional authority in 1987 by the Restatement (3rd) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 12 2 The Restatement
asserted that the "standard for adjudicating [a specialty violation]
motion in the United States is whether the requested state has
objected or would object to prosecution," and cited Paroutianand
Fiocconi for authority. 123
B. The Application of Paroutian-Fiocconi
to Treaty-Based Extradition
The Rauscher specialty interpretation was weakened further
in the 1980s and 1990s because the Paroutian-Fiocconiapproach
was applied to proceedings that were conducted pursuant to
treaty. 12 4 However the types of issues that were addressed did not
necessarily continue to expand the loophole. For example, in
United States v. Jetter,125 the court upheld the defendant's
conviction on conspiracy charges using the same rationale set
6 Because the Costa Rican court granted
forth in Paroutian.12
extradition after reviewing the indictment attached to the request
for extradition, and extradition was granted for charges set forth
in the indictment (apparently without any limitations), "it is clear
that Costa Rica would not object to appellants' trial on the
conspiracy counts."12 7

States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (affirming conviction on mail
fraud and theft counts in part because counts based on same facts as those

charges that extradition was granted for, and the treaty allowed such
prosecutions); United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 1009 (5th Cir. 1988)

(affirming the conviction of the relators on charges set forth in an indictment
issued in Texas, when extradition had been granted pursuant to an indictment
issued in Louisiana because the crimes in both indictments were of the same
"character and nature" and Mexico did not protest the prosecution of the
defendants on the additional charges); United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463,
1466-67 (11th Cir. 1988) (affirming conviction on mail fraud charges in part
because British magistrate knew that use of mails was element of fraud charges);
United States v. Jetter, 722 F.2d 371, 373 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming conspiracy
conviction in part because Costa Rican tribunal reviewed indictment with
conspiracy charge and did not place any limitations on prosecution when
extradition was granted). The exact disposition of this case is not clear as the
record is brief and the rationale conclusory. See Herbage, supraat 1464, 1466.
122.

See RESTATEMENT, supranote 22, § 477, at 578.

123. Id. § 477, cmt. b, at 579; reporters note 1, at 581.
124. See Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (U.K.); Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463 (U.K.); United
States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1988) (Switz.); Jetter, 722 F.2d 371
(Costa Rica).
125. 722 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1983).

126.

See id. at 373.

127.

Id.
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Likewise, in United States v. Cuevas12 8 the court was required
to interpret an ambiguous Swiss extradition order which granted
extradition for narcotics violations and related currency
transactions but prohibited the United States from prosecuting
the defendant for "the fiscal aspect of the factual circumstances of
the indictment." 12 9 The defendant argued that his conviction on
currency charges fell within the "fiscal aspect" identified by the
indictment, and were thus barred by the specialty doctrine. The
court, however, interpreted other language in the extradition
order to define "fiscal aspect" as taxes and fines upon the
currency transported by criminal activity. 3 0 The court then
determined that because the Swiss order consistently
characterized the narcotics and currency charges as integrally
related, the Swiss would not consider the charges to be separate
from those for which extradition was granted. 131
At least two courts, however, used the Paroutian-Fiocconi

standard to address conflicts that arose when the indictment that
was used to support an extradition request was superseded by an
indictment that served as the basis for the defendant's conviction.
In United States v. Abello Silva'3 2 the defendant was extradited
from Colombia 133 to face charges of conspiracy to import
controlled schedule I and II substances (marijuana and cocaine)
and conspiracy to possess marijuana and cocaine with intent to
distribute. 13 4 A superseding indictment setting forth such charges
was included with the United States extradition request. 13 5 After
Abello-Silva's extradition a second superseding indictment was
issued, and although it set forth the same offenses as the original
and superseding indictments, it contained new facts detailing
136
Abello-Silva's involvement in the conspiracies.

128. 847 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1988).
129. Id. at 1420. The term "fiscal aspect" was not defined in the extradition
order. See id
130. See id. at 1427.
131. See id at 1428.
132. 948 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1991).
133. Extradition was not granted pursuant to treaty but instead under
Presidential Decree No. 1860 (Republic of Colombia). See id. at 1171 n. 1.
134. See id. at 1172.
135. See id.
136. See iL The superseding indictment (included in the extradition
request) addressed several defendants and provided a general description of
Abello-Sflva's participation in the conspiracies. See id. The second superseding
indictment was directed only at Abello-Silva, and linked Abello-Silva with the

Medellin and Cali drug cartels and prominent drug lords such as Pablo EscobarGaviria, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez-Gacha, and Jorge Ochoa-Vasquez, and provided
details regarding the scope and operations of Abello-Silva's drug smuggling. See
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The court rejected Abello-Silva's contention that his
prosecution on the second superseding indictment violated the
specialty doctrine. 137 The court framed the issue by describing
the specialty doctrine as a means by which the ceding state could
ascertain whether sufficient evidence exists to extradite the
relator, and grant extradition for only those offenses supported by
sufficient evidence. 138 The court also noted that the appropriate
question under U.S. case law was whether the charges or offenses
for which the relator was extradited were the same as those for
which he was prosecuted, and not whether the facts on which
extradition was granted were the same as those on which the
prosecution of the relator was based. 13 9 In the court's eyes, this
line of inquiry was appropriate because extradition would only be
granted if the ceding state found sufficient evidence to grant
extradition. 140 Accordingly, additional facts which made the case
stronger would not change the outcome of the extradition
request, 14 ' and the ceding state that found sufficient evidence for
extradition would not be offended by the prosecution of the relator
142
on the basis of additional facts.
Likewise, the court in United States v. Andonian'43 rejected

an argument by co-defendant Vivas that his prosecution under a
superseding indictment violated the specialty doctrine. 144 Vivas
was extradited from Uruguay for money laundering and
conspiracy to aid and abet the possession and distribution of
cocaine.1 45 The superseding indictment that served as the basis
for his extradition included nine counts of money laundering that
were not included in the original indictment, and did not include
three counts of money laundering that were included in the
original indictment.' 4 6 The defendant argued that the specialty
doctrine was violated because he was not tried for the offenses for
which he was extradited and because he was not tried on the
facts that served as a basis for his extradition. 147
The court held that "separate offenses" for purposes of the
specialty doctrine did not mean separate counts. 148 "The
superseding indictment altered neither the nature of the scheme

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id. at 1172-76.
See id.at 1173.
See id. at 1173-74.
See iUL at 1174-75.
See i& at 1175.
See i&.
29 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994).
See id at 1437-38.
See i at 1434.
See i&
See id at 1435.
See id. at 1436.
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alleged nor the particular offenses alleged." 14 9 Accordingly, the
court was "confident" that Uruguay would not consider Vivas'
prosecution on the additional counts to be a breach of the
treaty. 150 Vivas' argument regarding his prosecution on facts that
did not constitute part of the evidentiary basis for his extradition
was also rejected: "The government is not required, under the
auspices of specialty, to try a defendant on the same evidence
that was presented to the surrendering state, so long as it
satisfies the requirement that trial is for the same offenses arising
out of the same allegations of fact." 15 1
152
Finally, although the court in United States v. Saccoccia
did not have to apply the specialty doctrine because of a
prosecutor's foresight, the court implied that it would consider
loosening the doctrine further.1 5 3 Saccoccia's extradition was
requested from Switzerland to face Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy charges.154 The
predicate acts which constituted the racketeering activity were
money laundering, failure to file currency transaction reports
(CTRs),15 s and use of travel and facilities in interstate commerce
to facilitate money laundering (Travel Act counts).15 6 Switzerland
granted extradition for all counts except failure to file CTRs and
illegally structuring money transactions
to avoid
CTR
requirements because the underlying conduct was not illegal
under Swiss law. 157
Although the individual CTR violations were subsequently
dismissed, immediately preceding and during the trial Saccoccia's

attorneys became concerned that Saccoccia could be convicted
under the RICO and Travel Act counts based solely on the
predicate offenses involving CTR violations, thus violating the

149. Id. at 1437.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 1438.
152. 58 F.3d 754 (1st Cir. 1995).
153. See id- at 768.
154. See id. at 764. RICO requires the government to prove an illicit
agreement to conduct pattern of racketeering activity. See id. A pattern requires
proof of at least two acts of racketeering activity. See id. These acts must
themselves be violations of specified criminal statutes and are referred to as
predicates or predicate acts. See i.
155. A CTR must be flied when an individual seeks to transport monetary
instruments of more than $10,000 at one time from a place in the United States
to or through a place outside the United States, or to a place in the United States
from or through a place outside the United States. 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a) (1994).
Failure to file is a felony. 31 U.S.C § 5324(c) (1994).
156. See Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at 764. Defendants faced 128 substantive
counts in addition to the RICO count. See id.
157. See id. at 765.
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specialty doctrine.1 5 8 This possibility was brought to the attention
of a Swiss official, who then voiced her concerns to the U.S.

Attorney's Office.' 59 At the request of the prosecutor, the trial
court instructed the jury that they could not use CTR violations
as predicates for the RICO or Travel Act counts. 160
The court ultimately held that the specialty doctrine was not
violated because the jury instruction "purged any taint" that
might have been created by allowing the jury to consider the CTR
16 1
offenses as predicate acts for the RICO and Travel Act counts.
However, the court expressed disbelief that allowing the jury to
utilize the CTR offenses would constitute a violation of the
doctrine because extradition was granted when the CTR offenses
were "prominently featured" as predicates to the RICO and Travel

Act counts. 162
This approval-to which we must pay the substantial deference
due to a surrendering court's resolution of questions pertaining to
extraditability... strongly suggests that the RICO and Travel Act

counts, despite their mention of predicates which, standing alone,
would not support extradition,
are compatible with the criminal
63
laws of both jurisdictions.1

The court summarily dismissed the Swiss official's concerns
regarding the prosecution as informal fretting, characterizing her
involvement as a "gossamer showing" which was insufficient to
show that Switzerland would object to the prosecution of the
RICO and Travel Act charges with CTR offenses constituting
16 4
predicate acts.

IV. STATE V. PANG
State v. Pangl6S should have been an easy case. Most of the
cases that followed the Paroutian-Fiocconi line of reasoning
involved superseding indictments or extradition orders that courts
deemed ambiguous. 16 6 However, in Pang the Federal Supreme

158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 768.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 132 Wash. 2d 852, 940 P.2d 1293, 1997 WL 425977 (1997) (en banc)
(pagination to Washington Reports, 2d Series, not yet available), opinion modified
and corrected by State v. Pang, 948 P.2d 381 (Wash.) (citation to Washington
Reports, 2d Series, not yet available), cert denied in Washington v. Pang, 118 S.
Ct. 628 (1997).
166. See supra Part III.A.
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Court of Brazil expressly denied extradition for the offenses in
dispute. 167 Nonetheless, the Pang dissent mounted a strong
attack upon the doctrine of specialty, drawing in part from those

cases that have loosely interpreted the doctrine. Fortunately, the
Pang majority stopped any further weakening of the doctrine by
refusing to allow prosecution. 168
The Pang case was highly publicized and politicized because
it involved the death of four Seattle firefighters. 1 6 9 On January 5,

1995, a warehouse owned by the parents of Martin Shaw Pang
burned to the ground. 1 7 0 The firefighters died in an attempt to
extinguish the blaze.171 The fire was determined to be arson, and

a fugitive warrant was issued for Pang's arrest in February
1995.172 In March 1995, Pang was charged with four counts of
first degree murder, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. 173
Later that month, he was arrested in

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 1 7 4

After Washington amended the information to include first degree
arson, 1 7 5

the United States

requested

extradition pursuant to

76
treaty for the arson charge and four counts of felony murder. 1

167. 'See Pang,940 P.2d at 1304 (quoting Federal Supreme Court of Brazil
decision on the Extradition, No. 00006541/120 Opinion Appendix "A" (English
translation from Portuguese)).
168.
See id. at 1325.
169.
See Four Seattle FirefightersKilled, supranote 1, at Al; Susan Gilmore
& Charles E. Brown, Feds launch Pang offensive, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996,
available at Seattle Times Web Archive, <http://wvw.seattletimes.com> (visited
Sept. 29, 1998); Peyton Whitely, Brazil 'Willing' to Deal on Pang-U.S.Seeks a Way
Around Ruling, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 2, 1996, available at Seattle Times Web
Archive, <http://www.seattletimes.com> (visited Sept. 29, 1998); House Bill
PressuresBrazil on Pang Case, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, available at Seattle
Times Web Archive, supra; Susan Gilmore, Maleng Seen as Both Tough, Soft,
SEATITLE TIMES, Apr. 1, 1996, available at Seattle Times Web Archive, supra; Janet
I-Chin Tu & Dave Birkland, Delays Expected in Pang's Trial, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
13, 1996, available at Seattle Times Web Archive, supra; David Postman, Threeway Supreme Court Race was Unexpected, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 10, 1998,
available at Seattle Times Web Archive, supra.
170.
See FourSeattle FirefightersKilled, supra note 1, at Al.
171.
See Pang, 940 P.2d at 1295. Pang is a U.S. citizen who was born in
Hong Kong. See id. at 1301 (quoting Affidavit of Marilyn B. Brenneman, Senior
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney). At the time of the fire he was living in the greater
Seattle area. See Four Seattle FirefjightersKilled, supranote 1, at Al.
172.
See Pang,940 P.2d at 1295.
173.
See id. at 1301 (quoting Affidavit of Marilyn B. Brenneman, Senior
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney).
174.
See iL at 1296.
175.
See id.
176.
See id. at 1297, 1303 (referring to Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 13, 1961,
U.S.-Braz., 15 U.S.T. 2093). For the text of the treaty, see also id. at 1354-6 1. An
amended information charging Pang with first degree arson was filed after the
original information. See icl. (quoting Affidavit in Support of Extradition). First
degree murder in Washington includes a felony murder rule, which provides for
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The Federal Supreme Court of Brazil granted extradition for
the arson charge, but denied extradition for the murder
charges. 17 7 The court's opinion was delivered in series of
individual opinions with an attached summary authored by the
chief justice and the justice assigned as rapporteur.178 The
summary stated:
The case files having been reviewed and the case stated and
discussed, the Justices of the Federal Supreme Court, meeting in
plenary session and acting by majority vote in accordance with the
minutes of the judgment and the transcript thereof, grants the
extradition in par4 on the grounds that the charges of arson in the

first degree, as described in the extradition request, correspond in
Brazil to the single crime that is defined in the main part of Article
250 and in Article 258 of the Brazilian Penal Code. Therefore, they
exclude from the grant of extradition the charges of murder in the
179
first degree.

The United States sought clarification of the order because it
found the wording to be ambiguous.' 8 0 The Federal Supreme

prosecution when a person "commits or attempts to commit ... (4) arson in the
and in the course of or in furtherance of such crime or in
first ...
degree ...
immediate flight therefrom, he... causes the death of a person other than one of
the participants...." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(c) (West Supp.1998).
First degree arson is defined as follows:
A person is guilty of [first degree arson] if he knowingly and maliciously:
(a) Causes a fire or explosion which is manifestly dangerous to any
human life, including firemen; or
(b) Causes a fire or explosion which damages a dwelling; or
(c) Causes a fire or explosion in any building in which there shall be at
the time a human being who is not a participant in the crime; or
(d) Causes a fire or explosion on property valued at ten thousand dollars
or more with intent to collect the insurance proceeds.
Id. § 9A.48.020(1) (West 1988). Both first degree murder and first degree arson
are Class A felonies, see id. §§ 9A.32.030(2), 9A.48.020(2), punishable by a
maximum of life in prison or $50,000 fine, or both. See id. § 9A.20.21(1)(a).
177.
See Pang, 940 P.2d at 1304-05 (quoting Federal Supreme Court of

Brazil decision on the Extradition, No. 00006541/120 Opinion Appendix "A"
(English translation from Portuguese) (emphasis in original).
178.
See id. at 1334-54 (containing the English translations of each
Justice's opinion). Justice Moreira Alves chose to follow the assigned justice's
opinion, offering only one paragraph of his own analysis. See id. at 1353. It is not
clear from the text of the Pang decision or the opinions of the Brazilian justices if
the multiple opinion format is commonly used.
179.
Id. at 1304-1305 (quoting Federal Supreme Court of Brazil decision on
the Extradition, No. 00006541/120 Opinion Appendix A" (English translation
from Portuguese)).
180.
See id. at 1305-06. The court's order stated that the crimes for which
Pang could be prosecuted (arson) corresponded with Articles 250 and 258 of the
Brazilian Penal Code. See id. at 1304 (quoting Federal Supreme Court of Brazil
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Court denied the request for clarification, stating unambiguously
that the grant of extradition did not include the murder
charges.1 8 1 The United States then sought to have officials within

the Brazilian executive branch waive any objections to
prosecution on3 the murder charges.1 8 2 These efforts were
1
unsuccessful.
Upon returning to Washington state, Pang moved to dismiss

the murder charges.184 The trial court denied his motion, finding
that although the Federal Supreme Court did not grant
extradition for the murder charges, the prosecution could proceed

because Brazil had implicitly waived its objection to Pang's
prosecution on the charges.1 8 5 The trial court held that Pang

decision on the Extradition, No. 00006541/120 Opinion Appendix "A7 (English
translation from Portuguese)). The United States argued that only Article 250,
simple arson, corresponded with the Washington arson statute because both code
sections, respectively, did not take the results of the arson into account. See id. at
1305-06 (quoting Request for Declaration [sic]). Because Article 258, aggravated
arson, took arson-caused deaths into account, the U.S. argued that the only
comparable Washington offense that would allow consideration of such facts was
the felony murder statute. Id. (quoting Request for Declaration [sic]).
181.
See id. at 1307.
182.
See id. at 1309-12. A letter was sent to the Minister of State for Justice
of Brazil, who declined to alter the Federal Supreme Court's ruling, stating that
the Brazilian separation of powers granted the Federal Supreme Court exclusive
jurisdiction over extradition proceedings. See id. at 1311-12 (quoting letter from
Nelson A. Jobim, Minister of State for Justice of Brazil to Janet Reno, United
States Attorney General (Sept. 26, 1996) (English translation from Portuguese)).
President Clinton also sent a letter to the President of Brazil, see id. at 1311, who
likewise declined to alter the court's ruling. See id. at 1312 (quoting Letter from
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil, to William J. Clinton, President
of the United States (Oct. 20, 1996)).
183.
See id. at 1311-12.
184.
See id. at 1312-13.
185.
See id at 1313. The trial court based its holding in part on its
interpretation of Minister Jobim's letter to Janet Reno, supra note 182, the last
paragraph of which stated:
As for your concern regarding possible limits on the requesting State's
right to punish vis-&-vis the extradited defendant, it should be emphasized,
on the basis offundamentalprecepts of public internationallaw, that legally
binding internationalacts are the only legal instrument capable of binding

two or more sovereign States together. Thus, provided that the terms of the
Treaty of Extradition between Brazil and the United States of America, of
January 13, 1961, are respected, it will be incumbent upon the Justice
system of the United States ofAmerica to establisha suitablepunishmentfor
the crime of arson in the first degree, resulting in four deaths and the
consequences thereof,under U.S. law. It goes without saying that the precise
interpretation of this language, used by the Brazilian court in its decision,
and the determinationof how it might best be adapted to U.S. law, are for the
justice system of your country to decide.
Id. at 1312 (emphasis in original). The trial court stated that "[b]y not objecting and
communicating as he did in the last paragraph and last sentence... it seems to this
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lacked standing to assert a treaty violation. '8 6 Pang subsequently
petitioned for direct review by the Supreme Court of
Washington.' 7
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
dismissed the murder charges, holding that (1) Pang had standing
to assert a treaty violation; (2) Brazil had not waived its right to
object;1 8 8 and (3) the doctrine of specialty required that Pang not
be charged because Brazil expressly excluded the murder charges
from its grant of extradition. 189
The majority bifurcated its application of the specialty
doctrine, addressing the presence of the doctrine first in
international law, and then in the express language of the
treaty. 190 In addressing the doctrine as a precept of international
law, the court first discussed the Rauscher decision, highlighting
the Rauscher Court's interpretation of specialty as a norm of

Court tantamount to a waiver of the provision of Article XXI of the Treaty." Id. at
1313. The Supreme Court of Washington also noted the content of a particular

affidavit submitted by the state in support of its Response to Motion to Dismiss. See
id. at 1309. A portion of the affidavit described a meeting between the United States
delegation of attorneys working on the Pang matter and Jobim, during which

"Justice Minister Jobim stated that Brazil has no objection to our prosecution of
[Mr.]Pangon the charges of Murderand Arson. Additionally, the Ministertold me that 'if
I were you, I would prosecuteon Murder-The United States system must decide.'" Id.
(emphasis in original). The affidavit was withdrawn by the state at the trial level, but
submitted to the Supreme Court in support of the State's Answer to Motion for
Discretionary Review. See id. at 1311. The court also noted that Pang's Brazilian
counsel informed Jobim of the contents of the affidavit in January of 1997, and that
Jobim returned a written response in which he stated, "I'd like to inform you that at
no time did Iprovide any type of interpretationon the content and reach of the decision
passed by the Federal Supreme Court." Id. at 1314 (emphasis in original). The
Washington Supreme Court strongly criticized the affidavit in a footnote in the
original Pangopinion, stating that "[z]ealous prosecution of a criminal case is highly
to be commended. But zealousness to the point of misleading, misrepresentation, or
fabrication is greatly to be condemned." Id at 1311 n.25. This footnote was
withdrawn by a subsequent order that amended the text of the opinion. See State v.
Pang, 948 P.2d 381 (Wash. 1997) (citation to Washington Reports, 2nd Series, not
yet available).
186.
See Pang, 940 P.2d at 1313.
187.
See id. at 1314.
188.
See id. at 1318, 1325. In holding that Pang had standing the court
followed the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417,
1426 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that an extradited person may raise any objections
to post extradition proceedings which might have been raised by the requested
state absent consent from the requested state) and United States v. Najohn, 785
F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that only express consent to prosecution
on additional charges will be considered a waiver of the doctrine of specialty). See
Pang 940 P.2d. at 1318-19. The court determined that Brazil had not explicitly
nor implicitly consented to prosecution. See id. Therefore, Pang had standing to
assert a treaty violation. See id.
189.
See id. at 1325.
190.
See id. at 1318, 1322.
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international comity. 19 1 The court also pointed out that the
doctrine is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3192, and observed that in
United States v. Alvarez-Machain the Supreme Court noted that
the federal statutes impose the doctrine of specialty upon all
extradition treaties to which the United States is a party.1 92 The
court then found that the doctrine, as incorporated in
international law and codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3192, required
Washington to prosecute Pang only for the offenses for which he
was surrendered. 193 Noting that Brazil expressly withheld its
consent to Pang's prosecution on the murder charges, the court
concluded that the doctrine obliged Washington to follow the
limitations, on prosecution imposed by the Federal Supreme Court
19 4
of Brazil.
The court then turned to the language of the United StatesBrazil extradition treaty to see if the language of the treaty
prevented Washington from prosecuting Pang on the murder
charges.'195 If the right to demand extradition is created by treaty,
the court noted, the treaty must usually list the particular offense
as an extraditable offense, and must satisfy the dual criminality
requirement.1 9 6 The court also noted that the doctrine of dual
criminality was specifically incorporated into the treaty, and that
19 7
murder and arson were both crimes enumerated in the treaty.
Moreover, the court acknowledged that "[d]etermination of
whether a crime is within the provisions of an extradition treaty is

within the sole purview of the requested state." 198 The court,
interpreting Article XXI of the treaty to incorporate the specialty
doctrine, concluded that the terms of the treaty required
99
Washington to prosecute Pang only on the arson charge. 1
The dissent in Pang framed its discussion by creating a new
analysis of the specialty doctrine. After examining the language
typically used to express the specialty doctrine in extradition
20 0
treaties, the dissent found three versions of the doctrine.
According to the dissent, the Rauscher version was the most
restrictive version of the doctrine, which "the majority erroneously
suggests is implied in every extradition treaty to which the United

191.
See id. at 1319 (citing United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886)).
192.
See id at 1319-20 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3192 (1994), United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 660 (1992) (citing Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 423).
193.
SeeicLat 1321.
194.
See id. at 1321-22.
195.
See id. at 1322.
196.
See id.
197.
See id- at 1323.
198.
Id. (quoting United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424, 429
(9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)).
199.
See id. at 1325.
200.
Id. at 1326-27.
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States is a party."20 1 The dissent further explained that the
version set forth in the United States-Brazil extradition treaty was
not the Rauscher version, but instead was a version which
allowed prosecution for any offense based on the facts as set forth
20 2
in the extradition request.

The dissent stated that, the Rauscher standard is applicable
only when the specialty doctrine is not expressly incorporated into

the treaty at issue. 20 3 The dissent pointed out that this argument
was supported by the language of the Rauscher decision, and by
the numerous cases which have allowed prosecution on additional
charges despite an alleged specialty violation.20 4 Moreover, the
dissent cited numerous cases where the courts had chosen not to
imply the doctrine but had instead confined their decisions to the
language of the particular treaties at issue. 20 5 Because the U.S.Brazil treaty included a specialty clause, the dissent concluded
that the more restrictive Rauscher interpretation could not be
20 6
read into the treaty.
Accordingly, the dissent focused on the actual language of
the U.S.-Brazil treaty,20 7 concluding that the plain meaning of the

201. See id. at 1326.
202. See id at 1326-27.
203. See id at 1327.
204. See id. 1328-29 (citing United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1991); Leighnor v.
Turner, 884 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Kauftnan, 858
F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1427 (9th Cir.
1988); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986); Fiocconi v.
Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1972)).
205. See id. at 1329 (citing United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 845
n.3 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir.
1995); United States v. Fowlie, 24 F.3d 1059, 1064 n.2, 1065 (9th Cir. 1994);
Andonian, 29 F.3d at 1435; United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1373 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1993); Levy, 905 F.2d at 328; Leighnor, 884 F.2d at 386; Sens 879 F.2d at
895; United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1465 (11th Cir. 1988); Cuevas,
847 F.2d at 1427; United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir. 1987);
Najohn, 785 F.2d at 1422; Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 481).
206.
See icL at 1327.
207.
See id. at 1330-33. The pertinent section of the treaty reads:
A person extradited by virtue of the present Treaty may not be tried or
punished by the requesting State for any crime or offense committed prior
to the request for his extradition, other than that which gave rise to the
request, nor may he be re-extradited by the requesting State to a third
country which claims him, unless the surrendering State so agrees or
unless the person extradited, having been set at liberty within the
requesting State, remains voluntarily in the requesting State for more than
30 days from the date on which he was released. Upon such release, he
shall be informed of the consequences to which his stay in the territory of
the requesting State would subject him.
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treaty required that the relator only be prosecuted for those
offenses for which extradition was requested.20 8 The dissent
emphasized that giving effect to these plain terms and refusing to

imply the strict Rauscher doctrine into the treaty had substantial
support in federal case law and specifically discussed the Fiocconi
and Sensi decisions, where prosecution on additional charges was
allowed: 20 9 "The majority never explains how these cases could
have been decided consistent with a rule that 2purportedly
10
prohibits such prosecutions in every extradition case."
The dissent's interpretation of the specialty doctrine was
undoubtedly incorrect. The dissent failed to notice that the cases
that it cited as precedent for allowing prosecution did not involve
foreign states expressly denying extradition for the disputed
offenses. 2 1 1 Most importantly, the dissent's interpretation of the
doctrine would have read the specialty clause out of the treaty, as
any crime set forth in the extradition request would be a
prosecutable offense.212
Although the majority reached the correct decision in State v.
Pang, this case should serve as a warning to those courts that
would loosely interpret the specialty doctrine. Moreover, it
suggests a need for a more restrictive interpretation of the
specialty doctrine.

V.

A MORE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE SPECIALTY DOCTRINE

This Note suggests that the relaxed specialty interpretations
set forth by the courts following Paroutian-Fiocconiare incorrect
because they too easily allow prosecution of the relator for
additional offenses. The correct method of interpretation would
require a court to presume that the relator may not be prosecuted
for additional offenses when extradition is conducted pursuant to
treaty. This interpretation is a necessary compromise:
Extradition treaties establish a bright-line rule that the requested
state retains discretion to extradite for all offenses that the
requesting state wishes to prosecute, but the procedural and
logistical difficulties of extradition may make such a rule
impracticable. Support for this interpretation is grounded in the

Treaty of Extradition, supranote 176, at 2110.
See Pang, 940 P.2d at 1330.
208.

209.

See ic. at 1330-32. The dissent also referred to other cases allowing

prosecution for additional offenses, including many of the Paroutian-Fiocconiline.
See id. at 1329.
Id. at 1330.
210.
See id. at 1329.
211.
See id- at 1330.
212.
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political realities of extradition as manifested in the structural
mechanics of the extradition process. Support may also be found
in Rauscher and through treaty interpretation.
A. Extradition: An Exception to the Rule
Contemporary extradition is a process by which state A
voluntarily subordinates part of its right of sovereign jurisdiction
to the interests of state B. 2 13 State A has no legal obligation to do
so under customary international law.2 14 Conversely, state B has

no right under customary international law to obtain control over
a person within the sovereign jurisdiction of state A to the
exclusion of A's control.2 15 An extradition treaty, then, creates a
legal obligation which is an exception to customary international
law.

2 16

This fact is compatible with political reality: because a state's
absolute sovereignty over its territorial jurisdiction is a
fundamental assumption upon which the authority of the state is
premised, any exception to the assertion of sovereignty must
necessarily be carefully defined and contained so as not to
impinge upon the authority of the state any further than
necessary. Thus, "[e]xtradition treaties exist so as to impose
mutual obligations to surrender individuals in certain
defined sets
2 17
of circumstances, following established procedures."
This reality manifests itself openly in domestic legislation that
addresses the interaction of extradition treaties and domestic
criminal law. Almost all states have some domestic legislation of
this kind.2 1 8 In the United States, such legislation is codified at

213.
See BAsSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 296; Papandrea, supranote 9, at 1187,
1197.
214. See Greene v. United States, 154 F. 401,410 (5th Cir., 1907) ("[A] state
is under no absolute obligation to surrender fugitives accused of [a] crime unless
it has contracted to do so."); United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th
Cir. 1995) (citing Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933)); BASSIOUNI,
supra note 3, at 383.
215. See Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 275, 277 (Nov. 20)
(holding that Colombia had no right under international law to unilaterally grant
asylum to Peruvian citizen at Colombian embassy in Lima, Peru, and have such a
decision be binding on Peru).
216. See BASSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 383. See also United States v. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992) ('The [extradition] treaty thus provides a

mechanism which would not otherwise exist. ... ").
217.

Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 664 (citing 1 J. MOORE, A TREATISE ON

EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION § 72 (1891)).

218. See ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 16, at 281. "Although it is possible
that one or more countries with which the United States has extradition relations
may not have domestic statutes regulating international extradition, generally it
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18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196, and courts have extensively interpreted
and applied these sections. The most important restriction is
that, with one small exception, extradition will not be granted
absent a treaty.2 19 Moreover, when an extradition request is
presented to the United States, very specific limitations are placed
2 20
upon the extradition process at the outset. For example:
1.
An evidentiary hearing must be held prior to granting
extradition at which a judge must determine if there is sufficient
221
evidence to sustain the charges.
2.
The offense alleged in the extradition request must be a
crime in the United States (thereby satisfying the requirement of
dual criminality). 22 2
3.
The offense must be listed in the treaty as an offense for
which extradition may be granted, or fall within the formula set
forth in the treaty.2 2 3
These examples illustrate how federal law carefully delineates
the requirements that another state must satisfy to remove a person
from the United States. A casual request to relinquish a fugitive will
not suffice because the appropriate processes must be followed.
Significantly, the punishable conduct must also be prohibited in the
United States, not only to ensure that the subjective value judgments
underlying U.S. criminal jurisprudence would sanction prosecution
(i.e., we must think the conduct is criminal), but also to ensure that
the theory of liability under which the fugitive is charged comports
with a theory of liability recognized by the United States.
The application of these rules by a federal court prior to
extradition results in prosecutions that are politically acceptable
to the United States because the relator is yielded in a manner
consistent with the boundaries articulated by the legislature and
the courts, and because the prosecution is analogous to the
criminal liability enforced in the United States. In short, the

can be assumed that a country from which the United States seeks extradition
regulates extradition by statute." I&
219. See Valentine v. United States ex. rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8-9
(1936). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1994) (providing for extradition, as a matter of
comity, of persons other than citizens, nationals, or permanent residents who
have committed violent crimes against U.S. nationals abroad). For the text of 18
U.S.C. § 3181, see supra note 29.
220. The identification of these limitations is meant to be illustrative, not
exhaustive.
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1994). This is in essence a probable cause
determination. See Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1996).
222. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 388-93. The offense may be a crime
under federal law or the state where the relator is found. See id. at 392; see also
Bozilov v. Seifert, 983 F.2d 140, 142 (9th Cir. 1992); Heilbronn v. Kendall, 775
F.Supp. 1020, 1024 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (citations omitted).
223.
See BASSIOUNI, supranote 3, at 393-400.
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limitations placed on the extradition process seek to mitigate the
infringement on United States sovereignty.
The language of extradition treaties is also drafted to
minimize extradition's impact upon a state's sovereignty. For
example, in 1997, a new extradition agreement between Hong
Kong and the United States was submitted to the Senate by
President Clinton. 22 4 The agreement listed numerous offenses but
provided that extradition would only occur for those offenses that
are punishable under the law of both parties by more than one
year in jail. 22 S Extradition for a capital offense may be refused if
the offense is not a capital offense under the laws of the requested
party. It may be granted, however, if assurances are provided that
the death penalty will not be imposed, or if imposed, will not be
carried out. 226 Extradition will not be granted for political
offenses, nor will it be granted if the extradition is politically
motivated, or sought for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing
the relator on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political
2 27
opinion.
When the doctrine of specialty is placed in the appropriate
context, as a component of a finite extradition agreement, the
doctrine is a consistent extension of a state's attempt to limit the
impact of extradition upon its sovereignty: it is the enforcement
tool which ensures that the procedures and rights established by
the treaty are respected.2 2 8 Because the requested state's grant of
extradition also controls the subsequent prosecution, the doctrine
ensures that the infringement on sovereignty will not be abused
to the advantage of the requesting state. The requested state has
the opportunity to enforce limits placed on extradition in the
applicable treaty, such as restricting prosecution to those crimes
for which probable cause has been established, or those crimes
that are consistent with the requested state's criminal
jurisprudence, or those which the requested state does not
consider political in nature. Thus, when extradition is granted
pursuant to treaty, specialty, like extradition in general, is not
based on comity, but upon the specific extradition agreement
created between two states.
Because extradition treaties go to great lengths to specify the
exact manner in which extradition is to occur, measuring
potential violations of the specialty doctrine by asking if the

224. See Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to InternationalLaw, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 493, 493 (1997).
225.
See id. at 493-94.
226.
See id. at 494.
227.
See id. at 495.
228.
See United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995);
Papandrea, supranote 9, at 1187.
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requested state would object to, or be offended by, the
prosecution of the relator on additional offenses assigns a
nonsensical meaning to the doctrine. The fact that specific
offenses are enumerated, particular conduct is prohibited, and
substantive requirements articulated suggests that the doctrine is
a bright-line rule: When extradition is conducted pursuant to
treaty, the requested state retains the discretion to grant
extradition for each offense that the requesting state seeks to
prosecute.229

B. United States v. Rauscher
Support for a bright-line rule can be found in United States v.
Rauscher.23 0 The Court observed that under the United StatesGreat Britain treaty, the offenses for which extradition was sought
had to be enumerated in the request. 23 1 The Court focused on the
logical extension of such a requirement, noting that if the
requested state had "no influence in limiting the prosecution in
the country where the offence [sic] is charged to have been
committed, there is very little use for this particularity in charging
a specific offence [sic] ... ."2
Moreover, the nature of the offenses in Rauscher also
supports a bright-line rule. Rauscher's extradition was requested
for murder. 23 3 He was prosecuted in the United States for cruel
23 4
and unusual punishment arising out of the same killing.
Although he was prosecuted for a crime arising out of the same

facts as those presented in support of the extradition request for
murder, and although he was prosecuted for a lesser offense, the
Supreme Court held he could not be so charged.2 3 5
C. Treaty Interpretation

Support may also be found for a bright-line specialty rule by
utilizing standard treaty interpretation methods. Every extradition

229.
This should not be confused with the argument made by the defendant
in United States v. Alvarez-Macham. 504 U.S. 655 (1992). Alvarez-Machain argued
that a bright line specialty rule necessarily precluded any other type of
extraterritorial transfer of fugitives. See id. at 664. The Court was very careful to
distinguish between transfer proceedings pursuant to treaty and those that were
not. See id. at 659-665. The proposition that this Note seeks to advance is limited
to extradition pursuant to treaty.
119 U.S. 407 (1886).
230.
Seeid. at421.
231.
232. Id.
See id. at 409.
233.
See id.
234.
See id- at 432-33.
235.
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treaty that the United States has become party to since Rauscher
has a specialty doctrine clause. 23 6 Although the specific language
of each clause will control, and each may be somewhat
different, 23 7 these clauses are all active components of a larger
extradition agreement.
This means that the text of the specialty clause must be
interpreted in the context of the extradition treaty.2 38 Hopefully,
the text of the clause will clearly describe the doctrine. If the
clause is poorly drafted, and is ambiguous, courts should recall
that while the intent of the parties in an extradition agreement is
to facilitate the transport of fugitives, it is also the parties' intent
that the requested state have considerable control over the
extradition process in order to limit the impact upon its
sovereignty. A court should not interpret a specialty clause to
restrict or remove this discretion, even if the plain meaning of the
text would produce such a result, because it is inconsistent with
the intent of the parties as manifested in the totality of the
agreement.
239
State v. Pang
is an excellent example of how a court may
use treaty interpretation methods to find a bright-line specialty
rule in an ambiguous treaty. The specialty clause in the United
States-Brazil extradition treaty is not a model of clarity. Article
XXI provides that "[a] person extradited by virtue of the present
Treaty may not be tried or punished by the requesting State for
any crime or offense committed prior to the request for his
extradition, other than that which gave rise to the

request.

236.

...

"240

Read literally, the clause suggests that the

See ABBELL & RISTAU, supranote 16, at 80.

237.
Compare Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S-U.K., art. XII, 28 U.S.T.
227, 233 ("A person extradited shall not be detained or proceeded against... for

any offense other than an extraditable offense established by the facts in respect
of which his extradition has been granted .... .") with Treaty of Extradition, supra
note 176, at 2110 ("A person extradited by virtue of the present Treaty may not be
tried or punished by the requesting State for any crime or offense committed prior
to the request for extradition, other than that which gave rise to the arrest....").
238.
See supraPart V.A. See also Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397-98
(1985) ("The analysis must begin ...
with the text of the treaty and context in
which the written words are used.") (citing Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49,
53-54 (1963)).
239.
940 P.2d 1293.
240. Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 13, 1961, U.S.-Braz., art. XXI, 15 U.S.T.
2093, 2110. The full text of Article XXI is as follows:
A person extradited by virtue of the present Treaty may not be tried or
punished by the requesting State for any crime or offense committed prior
to the request for his extradition, other than that which gave rise to the
request, nor may be re-extradited by the requesting State to a third
country which claims him, unless the surrendering State so agrees or
unless the person extradited, having been set at liberty within the
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relator may be prosecuted for any crime for which extradition is
requested, and this is the meaning that was adopted by the Pang
2 41
dissent.
The Pang majority, however, used the structure of the
extradition agreement as a whole to ascertain the true meaning of
the specialty clause. The court framed its discussion by noting
that the treaty expressly incorporated the doctrine of dual
criminality, and that the offense must be listed in the extradition
treaty.2 42 The court then emphasized that, under the treaty, the
satisfaction of these two requirements was determined by the law
of the requested state, and that determination of extraditability
was exclusively within the purview of the requested state. 2 43 As a
matter of good faith, the court felt obliged to yield to the Brazilian
court's determination that the felony murder counts were not
24 4
extraditable offenses.
Implicit in the court's reasoning was the notion that the
literal interpretation of the specialty doctrine in Article XXI would
render the dual
criminality
and
specific
enumeration
requirements meaningless. Under the literal interpretation of the
clause, so long as an offense was set forth in the extradition
request, a relator could be charged with an offense after
extradition, even if it was not enumerated in the treaty, and even
if it was not a crime in the requested state. Only by reading the
clause in the context of the extradition treaty could the court
arrive at the conclusion that the clause limits prosecution after
extradition to those offenses for which extradition was granted.
D. The PracticalReality of Extradition
Although there is support for a bright-line specialty rule in
the Rauscher holding, and extradition treaties may be interpreted
to require strict specialty application, the procedural realities of
present day extradition may not support such a rule.
Extradition is a usually a long, drawn-out, expensive
undertaking. 2 45 And requests for extradition to and from the

requesting State, remains voluntarily in the requested State for more than
30 days from the date on which he was released. Upon such release, he
shall be informed of the consequences to which his stay in the territory of
the requesting State would subject him.
IdL
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Pang, 940 P.2d at 1330-32 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 1322-23.
See id. at 1323.
See id. at 1325.
Pang sat in a Brazilian jail for two weeks shy of one year. See id. at

1296, 1305. Most extradition treaties have a clause providing that the requesting
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United States have increased sharply. From 1945 to 1960, there
were approximately 137 requests for extradition pursuant to
treaty made to the United States; 2 46 from 1980-82 U.S.
authorities arrested 149 persons for extradition to foreign
states.2 47 While there were approximately twenty requests both to
and from the United States each year in the 1960s, in 1991 alone
there were 718 such requests. 248 These numbers are expected to
increase as international criminal activity increases, and as states
react to international criminal activity with increased law
enforcement, legislation, 2 49and international agreements to
facilitate states' responses.
Any interpretation of international extradition agreements
must take note of the increased volume of extradition requests
and seek to avoid stilted procedures that, although reasonable on
an individual basis, may cumulatively result in a serious
impediment to extradition.2 s ° A bright-line specialty doctrine may
have such an impact.
1. Fatal Variance
Many specialty doctrine arguments have been raised when an

initial indictment is presented in support of an extradition
request, and the relator is prosecuted under a superseding
indictment which alleges new facts, new crimes, new counts, or

state will pay all costs for the extradition proceedings. See ABBELL & RISTAU, supra
note 16, at 153. At sentencing Pang was ordered to pay the $28,000 bill for his
own extradition. See Ronald K. Fitten, Family Strikes Deal with City in Pang Fire,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jul. 29, 1998, available at Seattle Times Web Archive,
<http://-vww.seattletimes.com> (visited Sept. 13, 1998).
246.
Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313, 1313
n. 1 (1962) (citing Letter from Eric Hager, Office of Legal Advisor of Department of
State, to Malcolm Wilkey, Assistant Attorney General (Apr. 18, 1960) on file with
Department of State, MS., File No. 211.3115 Perez Jimenez, Marcos /2-2960).
247.
See ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 16, at 12 n.5 (citing Reform of
ExtraditionLaws of the United States (H.R. 2643): Hearings Before the Subcomm.
On Crime, House of Representatives, Comm. on Judiciary,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4243 (1983)).
248.
See id. at 12 (citing Consular Conventions, Extradition Treaties, and
Treaties Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Legal Matters (MLATS: Hearing
before the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 13 (1992)).
249.
See id. at 12-17. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Globalization and the
FederalProsecutionof White Collar Crime, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 325 (1997); A. Paul
Victor, The Growth ofInternationalCriminalAntitrust Enforcement, 6 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 493 (1998) (discussing the expansion of international criminal antitrust
enforcement by the United States).
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 18 (discussing increased volume of
250.
extradition proceedings and the "overburdened, understaffed, and underfunded
national systems").
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all three. 2 5 ' These situations occur because a request for
extradition from the United States to a foreign state is usually
accompanied by supporting material to assist the appropriate
foreign authority in making the decision to extradite. 2 2 This
material is typically required by the extradition treaty or domestic
law of the requested state,2 53 and some treaties require the
requesting state to provide the official documents that set forth
the formal legal basis for the requesting state's prosecution of the
relator.2 5 4 As a result, it is common practice for the United States
to utilize a grand jury indictment or prosecutor's information as a
component of the request for extradition. 25 5 When properly
authenticated, an indictment or information provides the
requested country with an official document specifying that the
relator has been charged, the exact nature of the offense(s), and
the facts supporting the United States' desire to prosecute.
Although an indictment or information may represent the
basis for prosecution at the time that the request for extradition is

251. See generally United States v. Rossi, 545 F.2d 814, 815 (2d Cir. 1976)
(discussing a second indictment that attempted to charge the defendant with
trafficking narcotics over a greater period of time than had been alleged in the
initial indictment); United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1991)
(discussing a second indictment that added more facts about defendant's
participation in drug smuggling activities).

252.

See United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1993);

United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1427 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1466 (11th Cir. 1988); Rossi, 545 F.2d at 815; State v.
Pang, 940 P.2d 1293, 1297-1301 (Wash. 1997); see also ABBELL & RISTAU, supra
note 16, at 326-28.
253. In the United States, such material must be submitted with any
request to the United States for extradition because of the statutory requirement
that probable cause be found before extradition may be granted. See ABBELL &
RIsTAu, supranote 16, at 41-42.
254.
See Treaty of Extradition, supranote 176, at 2102-04.
The request for extradition . . . shall be supported by the following
documents ....
(2) . . . In the case of a person who is merely charged with a crime or
offense for which his extradition is sought: a duly certified or
authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest or other order of detention
issued by the competent authorities of the requesting State, together with
the depositions upon which such warrant or order may have been issued
and such other evidence or proof as may be deemed competent in the
case.

Id. See also Protocol to Treaty of Extradition, Sept. 4, 1990, U.S-Austl., art. VII, 27
U.S.T. 957 ("A request for the extradition of a person who is sought for
prosecution shall be supported by... a copy of the charging document, if any.").
255.
See Khan, 993 F.2d at 1371 (using an indictment); Cuevas, 847 F.2d
at 1427 (using an indictmenti; Herbage, 850 F.2d at 1466 (using an indictment);
Rossi, 545 F.2d at 815 (using an indictment); Pang,940 P.2d at 1297-1303 (using
an infornation); ABBELL & RISTAU, supranote 16, at 327.
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placed, new facts may change the theory of the prosecution's
case, and, as a result, the prosecution may wish to use additional
facts to support the existing charge or prosecute the relator on
additional charges or counts. At this point, the extradition process
collides with the constitutional rights of the defendant.
The allegations set forth in an information or indictment
2s 6
must closely follow the evidence that will be presented at trial.
Although this requirement is typically enumerated in rules of
criminal procedure, 2 5 7 the bases for the rule are two
constitutional rights of the defendant's: (1) to be placed on notice
as to the charges against him, and (2) to assert double jeopardy in
a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 25 8 The
constitutional requirement is satisfied so long as the defendant is
sufficiently apprised of the elements of the charge against him
(thus enabling him to mount a defense), and the charge is specific
enough to allow the defendant to assert double jeopardy in a
subsequent prosecution. 25 9 If the proof at trial varies from the
averments in the indictment to such an extent that either right is
substantially prejudiced, the variance is termed "fatal," and a
2 60
conviction will be reversed.
Accordingly, the prosecution must change the indictment or
information to reflect the facts as the prosecutor's investigation of
the case progresses. Although some jurisdictions allow a
prosecutor to amend an indictment upon her own initiative, the
Federal system and some states do not allow prosecutors to
amend indictments once issued.2 6 1 If any changes are to be made,

256.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c); NEIL P. COHEN & DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS 214-215 (1995).

257.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7

258.
At the federal level these rights are grounded in a defendant's Fifth
Amendment double jeopardy right and Sixth Amendment right to be informed of
the nature and cause of any accusation against him, as well as a defendant's
Fifth Amendment right to be tried on an indictment issued by a grand jury for an
infamous crime. See United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1985) (noting
Fifth Amendment right); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962)
(noting Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
82 (1935); United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 96-97 (6th Cir 1988) (noting
Fifth Amendment right); MARK S. RHODES, 1 ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES §§ 7:5, 7:6 (2d ed. 1985) (noting courts that have identified a
Sixth Amendment right). See also United States v. Illig, 288 F. 939, 942 (W.D. Pa.
1920) (noting that the two requirements also extend to informations).
259.
See Miller, 471 U.S. at 134-35; Russell, 369 U.S. at 764; Berger, 295
U.S. at 82.
260.
See Miller, 471 U.S. at 134-35; Russell, 369 U.S. at 761-72.
261.
See Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 13 (1887); COHEN & HALL, supra note
256, at 208.
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the prosecutor must go before a grand jury and have a
26 2
superseding indictment issued.
This substantive requirement of U.S. criminal law may
conflict with a bright-line specialty rule. A bright-line specialty
rule would not allow prosecution on new crimes or counts in a
superseding indictment or amended information because the
requested state did not have the discretion to allow prosecution
for those offenses. 2 63 The addition of new facts could also run
afoul of a bright-line rule because the conduct, as clarified in the
superseding indictment, may not be criminal in the requested
state. 2 64 Nor would a bright-line rule allow the addition of new
counts.
If a bright-line specialty rule were applied, a prosecutor
investigating a matter in which extradition was expected probably
would have three choices: deferring the extradition requests;
front-loading the investigation; or, proceeding as if the matter is
an ordinary domestic criminal matter. First, a prosecutor could
choose to defer a request for extradition until further investigation
occurs. However, if the fugitive is located in a foreign state, it
would probably be unwise for the prosecution to remain idle;
having already fled the United States, the fugitive is a serious
flight risk. Accordingly, the prosecution may wish to request
provisional detention pending a formal extradition request from
the United States. This is problematic, however, because once a
request for provisional detention has been made, an extradition
request typically must be submitted within a limited

timeframe. 26 5 As a result, if a detention request is made, a

See COHEN & HALL, supranote 256, at 208.
263. For additional counts the important determination to be made by the
foreign state is not if the conduct is criminal but if there is sufficient evidence to
sustain each count This should be distinguished from the situation where a
relator challenges his prosecution because the crimes in the extradition
agreement and the subsequent order are not identified by the same name, a
situation where the "technical niceties and distinctions recognized sometimes in
criminal law as maldng a fatal variance cannot be applied." Greene v. United
States, 154 F. 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1907).
264. This would be a fact-specific examination. If the extradition hearing is
viewed from the perspective of probable cause, the addition of new facts at a later
time would not be material if probable cause was already determined to be
present on the original set of facts. If, however, extradition was granted on one set
of facts, and a completely different set of facts was set forth in a superseding
indictment or amended information, there would probably be a specialty violation
as the requested state would not have the opportunity to determine if it
considered the conduct criminal or if probable cause were present. See generally
United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1172-76 (10th Cir. 1991); Mark S.
Weinstein, Casenote, A License to Mislead: United States v. Abello-Silva, 24 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. Rev. 161, 172-90 (1992).
265. See 18 U.S.C. § 3188 (1994). See also Mariane Nash, Contemporary
Practiceof the United States Relative to InternationalLaw, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 46
262.
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prosecutor will have to proceed with whatever supporting
documentation he has (i.e., the immediately available indictment
or information).
The prosecution's second option is to front-load the
investigative process, either through law enforcement or through
grand jury inquisition, in order to expose as many criminal acts
as possible prior to requesting extradition. The prosecutor's ability
to do so, however, will be tempered by facts available, actual
knowledge at an early stage of the investigation that the subject of
the investigation is outside the United States, and the actual
discovery of the fugitive, at which point the prosecutor will
probably feel compelled to act promptly for the reasons set forth
above.
The most likely alternative is that a prosecutor will proceed
as if the matter is an ordinary domestic criminal matter. When
the subject is located, the prosecutor will submit a request for
extradition detailing the basis for prosecution, probably
accompanied by an information or indictment. 2 66 If the ensuing
investigation after extradition uncovers more facts or crimes, the
prosecutor may try to avoid conflict with the specialty doctrine by
seeking a partial waiver of specialty from the executive branch of
the requested state.
If this fails, however, a bright-line specialty rule would force
the prosecutor to resubmit the new basis for prosecutiontypically the indictment or information-to the proper foreign
authority for authorization to prosecute as the investigation
evolves. Such action entails significant time and expense. In
complex criminal investigations, numerous requests may have to
be submitted to the requested state.2 67 Alternatively, the
prosecutor may choose not to prosecute crimes because the
benefit or likelihood of conviction is outweighed by the expense of
seeking the requested state's authorization to prosecute. A bright-

(1998) (noting the limit on detention in requested state post-extradition request in
new proposed United States-Organization of Eastern Caribbean States extradition
treaty submitted to Senate for advice and consent).

266. This is done with the assistance of the Office of International Affairs in
the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. See ABBELL & RISTAu, supra
note 16, at 322-23.
267. See generally United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 764-65 (Ist Cir.
1995) (first indictment with 150 counts, second superseding indictment with
141); United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1569-70 (11th Cir. 1995) (two
indictments); United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1994) (two
indictments); Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1172 (three indictments issued); United

States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1988) (separate indictments in
Louisiana and Texas); United States v. Rossi, 545 F.2d 814, 815 (2d Cir. 1976)
(txvo indictments).
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go
line specialty rule may be impracticable if a prosecutor has 2to
68
to such lengths on a significant number of extradition cases.
2. Time and Distance and the Right to a Speedy Trial
A bright-line specialty rule may result in conflicts with the
relator's right to a speedy trial. The Sixth Amendment's general
guarantee of a speedy trial applies to federal and state criminal
prosecutions. 2 6 9 Every state constitution except New York's
contains a similar provision. 2 70 However, the fact-intensive nature
of the inquiry utilized to determine violations of the Constitutional
guarantees makes it difficult to predict when such guarantees will
2 71
conflict with a bright-line specialty rule.
Possible conflicts with statutory speedy trial guarantees are
easier to identify. The Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974272 is an
example. Although only federal prosecutions are governed by the
Act, most states have also promulgated statutes that set definite
time periods within which the trial must occur.2 7 3 The federal and

state acts provide for a finite timeline between arrest and
indictment, and indictment and trial. 2 7 4 The acts also detail what
time is to be counted towards the timeline, and what time may be

excluded by the judge.2 7 5

If extradition to the United States has been granted, it is
likely that formal legal proceedings in the United States have been
initiated that are sufficient to trigger statutory speedy trial
requirements. 2 7 6 Accordingly, any superseding indictment or

268.
The expansion of U.S. antitrust investigations into international cartels
may provide such a flashpoint. As of February 1998, there were more than 20
U.S. grand juries investigating entities in 20 different countries covering
industries of $10 million to $1 billion. See Victor, supranote 249, at 493.
269.
U.S. CONST., amend. VI. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,
222-23 (1967).
270.
See COHEN & HALL, supranote 253, at 457.
271.
See generally Klopfer, 386 U.S. 213.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3161, 3162, 3164, 3173 (1994).
272.
273.
See ROBERT L. MISNER, SPEEDY TRIAL: FEDERAL AND STATE PRAcrIcE 330and statutory speedy trial
735 (1984) (detailing state constitutional
requirements).
274.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (b)-(c)(1) (1994); MISNER, supra note 273, at 337
(citing ALASKA R. of CRIM. P. 45) (providing that trial must occur within 120 days
of arrest), 699-700 (citing WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 3.3) (requiring trial within 60
days for in-custody defendants and 90 days for released defendants).
275.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1994); MISNER, supra note 273, at 702-03
(citing WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 3.3).
276.
See 18 U.S.C. §1361(c)(1) (1994) (providing that trial must take place
within 70 days of indictment or from the date that the defendant has appeared
before the judicial officer of the court in which the charge is pending). Time spent
imprisoned in a foreign state while waiting for extradition is excludable time for
the 70 day period. United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 153 (8th Cir. 1987). In
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information that details a new basis for prosecution, and that is
issued subsequent to extradition, must 'be submitted to the
appropriate authority in the requested state and approved within
the speedy trial time frame. In the Federal system, for example,
this generally means seventy days from the relator's first
2 77
appearance before the judge.
This may present a problem in a federal prosecution or a
state prosecution with similar timelines. Not only will all requests
to the foreign authority have to be submitted and received within
the requested time frame, but each request will be submitted
without knowledge of when the appropriate foreign authority will

render a decision. The issue becomes this: are the days that pass
while awaiting a decision of a foreign tribunal to be counted
towards the speedy trial limit or are they properly excludable from
consideration?
The issue probably will be raised initially by the prosecution.
Because the prosecution will want the speedy trial clock to stop
while awaiting the judgment of the foreign authority, it is likely
that the prosecution will concurrently (1) submit a request for
specialty waiver or authorization to prosecute to the appropriate
foreign authority, and (2) seek a continuance from the court to
stop the speedy trial clock.2 7 8 Although the Act does not contain
any specific provisions addressing extradition, it does allow for
continuances that do not count towards the speedy trial time
period as "the ends of justice" require. 2 79 In most cases involving
requests to foreign authorities a prosecutor will have to ask for a
so-called "open-ended" "ends of justice" continuance because the
end of the continuance is a time uncertain-the need for the
continuance will end when the foreign authority responds to the
United States' formal request for waiver or authorization to
prosecute. At present, the circuits are split as to whether 18
U.S.C § 3161(h)(8)(A) allows "open-ended" "ends of justice"
continuances.
Four circuits have held that 18 U.S.C § 3161(h)(8)(A) does
allow open-ended continuances. 28 0 The Fifth Circuit has

Thirion, the court held that the Act was triggered when the relator appeared before
a federal judge after extradition to the United States. See id.
277.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1994). A qualifying appearance is usually
an arraignment. See Thirion, 813 F.2d at 153.
278.
See, e.g., United States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456, 1458 (9th Cir. 1984)
(prosecution's motion to exclude time between arrest and indictment filed with
court before indictment handed down).
279.
See 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(8)(A) (1994).
280.
See United States v. Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 1997);
United States v. Twitty, 107 F.3d 1482, 1489 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1458 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d
866, 881 (3d Cir. 1992).
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suggested that it would allow open-ended continuances, 2 8 1 but
the Second Circuit has suggested that continuances should only
Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected
be for a time certain. 28 2 The
28 3
open-ended continuances.
Even in those circuits that allow open-ended continuances,
however, the ability of the court to grant such a continuance is
tempered by reasonableness in three circuits.2 8 4 Only the

Eleventh Circuit has categorically stated that "[ilf the trial court
determines that the 'ends of justice' require the grant of a
continuance, and makes the required findings, any delay is
excludable under § 3161 (h)(8)(A) ... ."285
It should also be noted that defendants in extradition cases
are likely to be incarcerated in the United States following their
extradition. Under the Federal Speedy Trial Act the incarceration
of the defendant mandates that special attention be paid to the
monitoring of the defendant's speedy trial status. 28 6 The Act
provides that a defendant who is being detained solely because he
is awaiting trial shall be tried within ninety days following the
beginning of detention, and the criteria for excluding days under
the normal speedy trial timeline in 18 U.S.C. § 3161 do not
28 7
apply.
Again, a bright-line specialty rule may be impracticable if the
government's requests for waiver or authorization to prosecute
results in the continued detention of relators in a significant
number of cases.
E. A Proposed Compromise: Stop and Count to Ten
Application of the specialty doctrine should be done in a
manner consistent with the applicable extradition treaty as well
as the limitations created by present U.S. criminal and extradition
practice. Courts should resolve the tension between these factors
with care. An appropriate compromise is an elevated level of
scrutiny: When a relator is charged with an offense for which
extradition is not granted, courts should presume that the relator
may not be so charged.
This presumption would be consistent with the intent of the
party states to effectuate extradition and do so in a manner which

281.
282.
283.
284.
982 F.2d
285.
286.
287.

See United States v. Jones, 56 F.3d 581, 585-86 (5th Cir. 1995).
See United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 358 (2d Cir. 1995).
See United States v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1994).
See Santiago-Becen-il, 130 F.3d at 18; Spring, 80 F.3d at 1458; Lattany,
at 881.
Twitty, 107 F.3d at 1489.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3164 (1994).
Id.
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is respectful of the requested state's right to limit the prosecution
of the relator post-extradition. Such a presumption would also
comport with the established U.S. civil practice of assigning the
burden of proof to the party with the best access to evidence. The
prosecution's resources, including those portions of the Federal
Government that interact with foreign governments on a regular
basis, are far better equipped to ascertain if the requested state
2 88
does indeed consent to prosecution on additional charges.
It is a far more difficult proposition to identify the types of
information that would overcome such a presumption. Express
waiver of the doctrine by the requested state would easily satisfy
the presumption. However, a court should not imply waiver by
virtue of a state's silence when the relator has been prosecuted on

additional charges. 28 9 Implied waiver should also be avoided
unless there is clear evidence that the requested state has tacitly
agreed to prosecution.
While each case

will

be

necessarily

fact-specific,

a

presumption that the relator may not be prosecuted for additional
offenses will require a court interpreting the doctrine to do more
than pause before allowing the prosecution to proceed. The
specialty doctrine must be given its due place as intended by the

parties, and not simply set aside with nominal consideration.
Such a presumption will also contain the ramifications of the
loose specialty interpretations set forth in Paroutianand Fiocconi.

VI. CONCLUSION

Courts must stop treating the specialty doctrine with disfavor
and give close attention when a relator claims that the specialty
doctrine has been violated. Because courts have consistently used
perfunctory analyses, and have not examined the doctrine within
the context of an extradition agreement, specialty interpretations
that allow prosecution for additional offenses are reading the rule
out of existence. An appropriate compromise between the brightline specialty doctrine set forth in most extradition treaties and
the realities of extradition is a presumption that the relator may
not be prosecuted for additional offenses beyond those for which
extradition was granted. Such a presumption will be consistent
with the text of the extradition treaty and will give effect to the
intent of the party states because it will facilitate extradition and

288.
289.

See ABBELL & RISTAU, supranote 16, at 349.
See United States v. Khan, 993 P.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[W]e

will not infer an agreement to extradite from Pakistan's silence concerning Count
Vill.-).
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leave the discretion to extradite to the requested state. Above all,
it will enable the doctrine of specialty to be viable in fact as well
as in form.
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